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ARTICLE

No Longer Immune? How Network
Theory Decodes Normative Shifts in
Personal Immunity for Heads of State
NADIA BANTEKA

The customary internationallaw (CIL) norm ofpersonalimmunity for
Heads of State has come under significantfire in the past decade. While
immunity norms have traditionally been absolute, the increasing influence of
the human rights and anti-impunity movements, coupled with pleas for
international criminal responsibility for egregious human rights and
humanitarianviolations, have eroded them, particularywithin international
jurisdictions. These changes reflect a largerchallenge to the traditionalstatecentric model. Although states remain the primary makers of international
law, many otherparticipants, including internationalorganizations, courts,
and non-governmentaloganizations (NGOs), are crucialto the development
of internationallegal norms today. But there is, ofyet, no formal model
integrating these actors into existing legal frameworks. The goal of this
Article is to provide an analyticalframework to appy to the shifting norm
of personal immunity for Heads of State based on the relationships and
connections among actors. Using the tools of network theory, this Article
determines the defining properties of this network of actors, including its
topology, density, centraliy, and actor similarity, which explain current
normative shifts and predict developments. Based on this quantitative
analysis, this Article putsforward two arguments. First, non-state actors,
even though notformaly accepted as capable of contributing to international
law, have a clear normative effect. Second, insofar as the hubs in this network
continue to pursue an exception to Head of State immunity before
InternationalCriminalCourts, we are likey to see an exception cystalliZe
as a new rule of CIL. Vie)ing internationallaw through networks of actors
provides lawyers andpoly-makerswith a descriptive toolthat translatesand
maps the elusive global realities that lead to internationallaw-making.

* Visiting Assistant Professor, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
Visiting Fellow, Yale Law School. I would like to thank William Burke-White, and Erika
Nyborg-Burch for their valuable feedback on earlier drafts. This Article benefited greatly
from the constructive comments of Jean Galbraith, Beth Simmons, and the participants of
the Perry World House conference on International Law and International Relations.
Thank you also to Svetlana Atanasova and Olivia Flasch for their excellent research
assistance. Finally, thank you to Jake Rush and the editors of Virginia Journal of
International Law for their constructive suggestions and edits. All errors are my own.
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INTRODUCTION

State officials are entitled to two types of immunity from
criminal prosecution in a foreign court: functional immunity
(immunity ratione materiae) and personal immunity (immunity ratione
personae).2 This Customary International Law (CIL) rule derives
from the principles of state sovereignty and sovereign equality, 3 and
reflects the idea that foreign entities should not be able to hinder
the official performance of state representatives by means of their
domestic jurisdiction. 4 In other words, immunity seeks to protect
freedom of movement and negotiation among states and their
agents, recognizing their need to perform those functions without
impediment by other states. 5 The International Court of Justice

1. For an excellent discussion of the doctrine of functional immunity, see Prosecutor
v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-AR108, Appeals Chamber Decision, ¶ 38-45 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 29, 1997). Other expressions are also used to refer to
functional immunity, such as immunity ratione materiae or immunity from jurisdiction for
official acts. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 361-62
(5th ed. 1998).
2. See YITIHA SIMBEYE, IMMUNITY AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 109-111

(2004) ("[I]mmunity ratione personae relates to the individual and materae to the acts.");
Chanaka Wickremasinghe, Immunities Enjoyed by Qificialsof States and InternationalOrganisations,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW 387, 389-90, 395 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 1st ed. 2003) (discussing
the differences between functional and personal immunity and when they are applied);
Dapo Akande, InternationalLaw Immunities and the InternationalCriminalCourt, 98 AM. J. INT'L
L. 407, 409 (2004) (noting that some officials enjoy broad immunity while others have
immunity only for official acts).
3. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 202 (June 27); see also MALCOLM N. SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 697 (6th ed. 2008) (arguing that international law requires respect
for territorial integrity and the political independence of other states).
4. See BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURT: BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 129 (2003) ("[T]he
purpose of...privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the
efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing States.").
5. See Michael A. Tunks, Diplomats or Defendants? Defining the Future of Head-of-State
Immunity, 52 DUKE L.J. 651, 656 (2002) ("Head-of-State immunity allows a nation's leader
to engage in his official duties, including travel to foreign countries, without fearing arrest,
detention, or other treatment inconsistent with his role as the head of a sovereign State.
Without the guarantee that they will not be subjected to trial in foreign courts, Heads of
State may simply choose to stay at home rather than assume the risks of engaging in
international diplomacy."). The same may be said of others entitled to immuni> ratione
personae. In 2010, Gordon Brown, then prime minister of the UK, expressed a similar
concern. Gordon Brown, BritainMust ProtectForeign Leadersfrom PrnvateArrest Warrants, THE
TELEGRAPH
(Mar.
3,
2010,
10:00
PM),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/gordon-brown/7361967/Britain-mustprotect-foreign-leaders-from-arrest.html ("There is already growing reason to believe that
some people are not prepared to travel to this country for fear that such a private arrest
warrant - motivated purely by political gesture - might be sought against them. These are
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(ICJ) has emphasized that there is "no more fundamental
prerequisite for the conduct of relations between States than the
inviolability of diplomatic envoys and embassies." 6 These
immunities have traditionally been perceived as necessary for the
maintenance of a system of peaceful cooperation and co-existence
among states.7
Functional immunity attaches to state officials strictly while they
hold office and is confined to the official acts carried out during that
period alone. This stems from the notion that official acts by a
representative of a state are fully attributable to the state and not
individually to the representative. 8 Officials with functional
immunity may be subject to legal proceedings for acts that fall
outside of their office period, or for acts they commit in personal
capacity even while holding office.
Personal immunity originally represented the idea that the
person and her position reflected the sovereignty of the state. 9

sometimes people representing countries and interests with which the UK must engage if
we are not only to defend our national interest but maintain and extend an influence for
good across the globe.").
6. U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J.
Rep. 3, ¶ 91 (May 24).
7. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (D.R.C. v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 3
(Feb. 14) [hereinafter 2000 Arrest Warrant Case] (full immunity allows a Minister of Foreign
Affairs to perform her duties). "[I]mmunities are granted to high State officials to guarantee
the proper functioning of the network ofmutual inter-State relations, which is of paramount
importance for a well-ordered and harmonious international system." Id. ¶ 75 (joint separate
opinion by Higgins, J., Kooijmans, J., and Buergenthal, J.)
8. Paola Gaeta, Official Capaciy and Immunities, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 976 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds.,

2002) [hereinafter Gaeta, Official Capactjy and Immunities]; Akande, supranote 2, at 412-13; see
also, Zoernsch v. Waldock [1964] AC 675 (HL) 691-92 (appeal taken from UK) ('A foreign
sovereign government, apart from personal sovereigns, can only act through agents, and the
immunity to which it is entitled in respect of its acts would be illusory unless it extended
also to its agents in respect of acts done by them on its behalf").
9. See Arthur Watts, The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of states, Heads of
Governments and Foreign Ministers, 247 RECUEIL DES COURS [Collected Courses] 9, 53, 10203 (1994) (noting that Heads of States enjoy different immunities through the differences
in what their respective roles symbolize); see also, R. v. Bow St. Metrop. Stipendiary
Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte [2000] 1 AC (HL) 119, 135, 239 (UK) ("[A] Head of
State...enjoyed by reason of his status absolute immunity from all legal process. This had
its origin in the times when the Head of State truly personified the state. It mirrored the
absolute immunity from civil process in respect of civil proceedings and reflected the fact
that an action against a Head of State in respect of his public acts was, in effect, an action
against the state itself There were, however, other reasons for the immunity. It would have
been contrary to the dignity of a Head of State that he should be subjected to judicial
process and this would have been likely to interfere with the exercise of his duties as a Head
of State. Accordingly, the immunity applied to both criminal and civil proceedings and, in
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Contemporary international law now emphasizes the need to ensure
the effective performance of the official's functions on behalf of
the state as grounds for personal immunity.1 0 Personal immunity
thus represents the notion that certain state officials must be able to
operate freely in the sphere of international relations without any
restrictions arising from arrest, detention, or legal proceedings in
foreign jurisdictions. This immunity is absolute in that it extends to
both official and private acts. 11 It further attaches to the position
itself: Whereas functional immunity continues and may be invoked
after the expiration of one's office, personal immunity survives only
up to the end of the term of the official involved. 12 Thus, in
determining whether an official is entitled to immunity, courts ask
whether the process initiated by the foreign state seeks to subject an
official currently holding a certain position to its jurisdiction when
entitled to immunity.
The scope of immunity remains an open question. In the Arrest
Warrant Case, for example, the ICJ recognized that State officials
"such as Heads of State, 13 Heads of Government,14 and Ministers
for Foreign Affairs" 15 undoubtedly enjoy immunity by virtue of
their role representing the State in its international relations. 16 The
use of the phrase "such as" may indicate that the Court did not
so far as civil proceedings were concerned, to transactions entered into by the Head of State
in his private as well as his public capacity.").
10. Memorandum from the Secretariat on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign
Criminal Jurisdiction, 1-206, U.N. Memorandum A/CN.4/596 (Mar. 31, 2008) [hereinafter
Secretariat Memorandum].
11. See 2000 Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 7, ¶ 58 (holding that it could not find
"under customary international law any form of exception to the rule according immunity
from criminal responsibility and inviolability to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs,
where they are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity").
One scholar, Akande, notes that this principle has been applied by several national courts,
that "judicial opinion and state practice on this point are unanimous," and that courts have
unanimously held that immunity rationepersonaeapplies to international crimes). See Akande,
supranote 2, at 407, 411; see also Tunks, supranote 5, at 663 (noting that no nation has passed
judgement against a sitting head of a foreign state).
12. Khurts Bat v Investigating Judge of the German Federal Court [2011] EWHC
(Admin) 2029 [55]; see also Secretariat Memo, supranote 10, at 58-59.
13. See, e.g., Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djib. v. Fr.),
Judgment, 2008 I.C.J. Rep. 177, ¶ 18, 47 (June 4) [hereinafter Certain Questions Judgment];
Concepcion Escobar Hernindez (Special Rapporteur), Second Report on the Immunity of State
Officialsfrom Foreign CriminalJursdiction, ¶ 66-67, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/661 (Apr. 4, 2013)
[hereinafter Second Report on Immunity]; 2000 Arrest Warrant case, supra note 7, ¶ 51.
14. 2000 Arrest Warrant case, supra note 7, ¶ 51; Second Report on Immunity, supra
note 13.
15. See sources cited supranote 14.
16. Id.; see also Dapo Akande & Sangeeta Shah, Immunities of State Officials, International
Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 815, 825 (2011).
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intend for this list of officials to be exhaustive. 17 Other officials have
increasingly come to represent the State in international relations, 18

and a number of domestic cases have found that a limited number
of ministers, other than Ministers for Foreign Affairs, also enjoy
personal immunity. 19 Yet International Law has yet to explicitly
establish this extension of personal immunity. 20 Despite this
ambiguity in jurisprudence, personal immunity has generally been
understood to attach to Heads of State and government, foreign
ministers, and possibly some additional principal officials on
account of their office. Due to the nature of their position and acts
performed, such officials may be endowed with both personal and
functional immunity at once, with each type of immunity bearing its
own legal effect and application. 21
Despite the customary nature of these immunities, advances in
the fields of human rights and international criminal justice have
begun to challenge them. The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials were the
first to reveal a "strain between yet unsystematized notions of
international public order and the traditional precepts of
international law, largely based on the sovereignty paradigm." 22
These Courts enforced the principle that international crimes
implicate the responsibility of the state but also the personal
criminal responsibility of the perpetrator. 23 The increasing

&

17. Re Mofaz [2004] 119 I.L.R. 709, 712 (Bow St. Magis Ct.) (UK); see also Akande
Shah, supra note 16, at 820-21.
18. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (D.R.C. v. Rwanda), Judgment,
2006 I.C.J. Rep. 6, ¶¶47-48 (Feb. 3).
19. Khurts Bat v Investigating Judge of the German Federal Court [2011] EWHC
(Admin) 2029 [60-61]; Re Mofaz [2004] 119 I.L.R. 709, 712 (Bow St. Magis Ct.) (UK); Re
Bo Xilai [2005] 128 I.L.R. 713, 714 (Bow St. Magis Ct.) (UK).
20. See sources cited supra note 14; see also Certain Questions Judgment, supra note 13.
21. Michiel Blommestijn & Cedric Ryngaert, Exploring the Obligationsfor States To Act
Upon The ICCs Arrest Varrantfor Omar Al-Bashir, 6 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR INTERNATIONALE
STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK [Magazine for International Criminal Theory] 429-33 (2010).
22. Andrea Bianchi, Immunity Versus Human &ghts: The Pinochet Case, 10 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 237, 271 (1999).
23. The Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany
Signed at Versailles art. 227, June 28, 1919 ("The Allied and Associated Powers publicly
arraign William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence
against international morality and the sanctity of treaties."); Agreement for the Prosecution
and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the
International Military Tribunal art. 7, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 280 ("The official position
of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government
departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating
punishment."); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 147 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998); G.A. Res. 95 (I) 1 (Dec. 11, 1946)
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influence of the human rights and anti-impunity movements,
coupled with pleas for international criminal responsibility for
egregious human rights and humanitarian law violations, have
further eroded traditional immunities norms particularly within
international jurisdictions, causing a clash between the traditional
CIL rules of foreign officials immunity and the developing field of
International Criminal Law 24 The relatively recent establishment of
international criminal justice and the actors involved have blurred
the exact scope of protection that the rules of immunity offer.
These challenges that raise issues of immunities are
often rooted in a larger challenge to the traditional state-centric
model and an increase in the number of actors that participate in
the contemporary international system. Although states remain the
primary makers of international law, many other participants
including international organizations, courts, as well as influential
entities in international law advocacy, such as non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), are also crucial to the development of
international legal norms today. 25 But there is, of yet, no formal
model integrating these actors into existing frameworks that are
theoretically and legally structured only for states. The goal of this
Article is to provide such an analytical framework and to apply it to
the shifting CIL norm of personal immunity for Heads of State
before International Criminal Courts and Tribunals.
Using the tools of network theory, this Article will track
the shift of this norm through descriptive mapping of the rule's
development. This analysis will be premised on links, relationships,
and connections among the actors involved in the normative
development processes. Seeing international law-making processes
through networks of actors will provide international lawyers and
international policy-makers with a descriptive tool that translates
and maps this elusive process. To perform this network analysis, the
Article will identify the relevant actors who participate in the
relevant international legal processes, and their various degrees of

(affirming "the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal").
24. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 309 (2d ed. 2008); see also
Akande, supra note 2, at 407.
25

See

generally

ALAN

INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007).

BOYLE

&

CHRISTINE

CHINKIN,
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MAKING
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participation, and capabilities. 26 These state and non-state actors
connect in networks through which they pursue their normative
agendas and contribute to international law. Descriptive quantitative
work that analyses these actors' normative contributions in these
networks will clarify dynamics such as levels of socialization within
a network or networks, diffusion of norms based on the nature and
strength of actors or ties, the importance of certain individual
actors, and the levels of development of distinct emerging or
shifting norms. 27 These insights will hopefully shed some different
light on the Head of State immunity debate in international criminal

justice.
In the first part of this Article, I discuss the shifting landscape
of the CIL norm of personal immunity for Heads of State. I begin
by analyzing the existing jurisprudence and debate on personal
immunity before domestic and international courts, tracing the
relevant actors eroding the absolute nature of personal immunity
before International Criminal Courts and Tribunals (ICCTs). Then,
I determine the actors involved in the network responsible for this
normative shift: The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals provide the
first instance where senior governmental officials with immunities
were prosecuted for international crimes; The International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) established the
CIL nature of the exception to personal immunity for the crimes
that fall within its jurisdiction; The Special Court for Sierra Leone
(SCSL) found that personal immunity does not prevent a Head of
State from being prosecuted before an international criminal
tribunal; Most recently, the International Criminal Court (ICC),
through its various organs and actors involved, weakened personal
immunity within its jurisdiction. Finally, I discuss the positions of
other relevant International Organizations such as the United
Nations (UN), African Union (AU), and epistemic communities
such as the Institute of International Law on the removal of
immunities.
In the second part of this Article, I apply the tools of Social
Network Analysis (SNA) to the information and data from Part I to
describe and evaluate the shift in personal immunity norms for
Heads of State. Through graphing the network of actors involved,

26 Andrea Bianchi, The FightforInclusion: Non-State Actors andInternationalLaw, in FROM
BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF BRUNA SIMMA
(Ulrich Fasenrath et al. eds., 2011).
27 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al., Network Analysisfor InternationalRelations, 63 INT'L
ORG. 559, 569 (2009).
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I discover its defining properties, including its topology, density,
centrality, and actor similarity, which together explain the growing
shifts in personal immunity norms and predict further normative
development within the network. Based on this quantitative analysis,
I put forward two main arguments. First, non-state actors, even
though not formally accepted as capable of contributing to
international law making, have a clear normative position and lawmaking effect. Second, insofar as the predominant hubs in this
network continue to pursue the establishment of an exception for
Heads of States before ICCTs, we are likely to see it crystallize as a
new rule of CIL.

II. THE CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW NORM OF
PERSONAL IMMUNITY

Due to the absence of a comprehensive international treaty
regulating the rules on immunity of governmental officials, these
rules are largely part of CIL. Under CIL, there are two instances
where the jurisdictional bar of personal immunity may be relevant:
(1) national proceedings and (2) proceedings before international
criminal courts and tribunals. The main purpose of personal
immunity has traditionally been to allow high-level state officials to
operate in the international sphere without being subjected to
foreign jurisdictions. The purpose of this facet of personal
immunity remains relevant today to permit Heads of State to fully
pursue their domestic affairs and to maintain equilibrium in
international relations. For these reasons, it is largely accepted 2 8 that

28. This position has received some pushback even by the ICJ. A criticism is found in
2000 Arrest Warrant Case, supranote 7. Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal noted
that "the Court diminishe[d] somewhat the significance of Belgium's arguments" and
expressed their doubts as to the practical significance of the circumstances, highlighted by
the Court at paragraph 61, in which immunity would not represent a bar to criminal
prosecution. See 2000 Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 7. In his dissenting opinion, Judge
Al-Khasawneh took the view that "the effective combating of grave crimes has arguably
assumed ajus cogens character reflecting recognition by the international community of the
vital community interests and values it seeks to protect and enhance. Therefore, when this
hierarchically higher norm comes into conflict with the rules on immunity, it should
prevail." In her dissenting opinion, Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert found a "fundamental
problem" in the Court's general approach "that disregards the whole recent movement in
modern international criminal law towards recognition of the principle of individual
accountability for international core crimes," preferring "an extremely minimalist approach
by adopting a very narrow interpretation of the 'no immunity clauses' in international
instruments"; see also Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixtieth Session, 1-206,
U.N. Doc. A/63/10 (Aug. 2008).
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personal immunity extends to instances of domestic foreign
jurisdiction, even if the official in question is alleged to have

committed international crimes. 29
for

The Arrest Warrant case is notorious as to issue of immunity
high-ranking officials before domestic courts. The ICJ

adjudicated Belgium's indictment of Abdoulaye Yerodia, who was
then the serving Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), for alleged international crimes violated
his immunities. 30 It found Belgium had violated the immunity of the
Congolese minister of foreign affairs by issuing an arrest warrant
against him. 31 The ICJ confirmed the rule of personal immunity in
the Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
Case regarding France's failure to execute Djibouti's letter rogatory
in accordance with the states' bilateral agreements for cooperation
and mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. 32 It emphasized that
a Head of State enjoys "full immunity from criminal jurisdiction" 33
protecting "against any act of authority of another State, which
would hinder him or her in the performance of his or her duties." 34
With these cases, the IJC established that personal immunity
governs domestic jurisdiction over foreigners, even if the official in
question is alleged to have committed international crimes. 35
The issue of personal immunity for high-level state officials is
less clear regarding the jurisdiction of international criminal courts
and tribunals. The ICJ ruled in the Arrest Warrant Case that it "has

been unable to deduce [...] that there exists under customary
29. See Dapo Akande, The Legal Nature of the Securiy Council Referrals to the ICC and its
Impact on Al Bashir's Immunities, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 333, 334 (2009) ("Under customary
international law, the person of the Head of State is regarded as inviolable when abroad and
immunity from criminal jurisdiction includes immunity from arrest."); Paola Gaeta, Does
PresidentAlBashirEnjoy ImmunityfromArrest?, 7J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 315, 318 (2009); Akande,
supranote 2, at 407, 411. The ICJ has acknowledged this principle. See 2000 Arrest Warrant
Case, supranote 7, ¶ 58. Other jurisdictions have also recognized this principle. See Cour de
cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Mar. 13, 2001, Bull. crim. No.
1414 (Fr.) (arrest warrant for Muammar al-Gaddafi); Tachione v. Mugabe, 169 F.Supp.2d
259 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), affm'd, 386 F.3d 285 (2004); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT95-17/1-T, Judgment ¶¶ 140, 156 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 10,
1998); Re Sharon & Yaron [Cass. [[Court of Cassation], 2003, 42 I.L.M. 596; Tania Branigan,
Mugabe Arrest Bid Fails, THE GUARDIAN
(Jan.
14,
2004,
9:16
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2004/jan/15/zimbabwe.world.
30. 2000 Arrest Warrant Case, supranote 7, ¶ 58.
31. Id.
32. Certain Questions Judgment, supra note 13.
33. Id.

34. Id.
35. See sources cited supranote 29.
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international law any form of exception to the rule according
immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability [...], where they
are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against
humanity." 36 But, the Court felt compelled to add, "immunity from

jurisdiction [...] does not mean that [Heads of State] enjoy impunity
in respect of any crimes they might have committed." 37 It is on this
premise that the Court introduced an exception to the general rule
of immunities in four circumstances. 38 First, immunities do not bar
criminal prosecution when the accused is brought to trial before the
domestic courts of her own state. 39 Second, the official's own state

may decide to waive the immunity afforded to said official. 40 Third,
a high ranking state official may be subject to criminal jurisdiction
once she has left office and is brought before the courts of a foreign
state for acts committed before or after the period of office, or acts
committed during office but in a private capacity subject to any
subsisting functional immunity.4 1 Finally, and this is the point that is
most interesting for present purposes, the Court suggested that
high-ranking officials may be prosecuted before "certain
international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction." 42 As
evidence of this last exception, the Court mentioned several
examples of international criminal courts that possess the authority
to prosecute high-ranking officials, including the ICTY, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the ICC.43
The Court provided only limited material support for this
statement and was satisfied with mere reference to the statutes of

these International Criminal Courts and Tribunals. It noted that
Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute provides that "immunities [..]
which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under
national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising
its jurisdiction over such a person."44 The implication is that
personal immunity exists only in relation to horizontal criminal
36. See 2000 Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 7, ¶ 213 (although concerning the
immunity held by Ministers of Foreign Affairs, considering the process of analysis, it applies
by analogy to Heads of State).

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.¶ 217.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

42. 2000 Arrest Warrant Case, supranote 7, ¶ 213.

43. Id.
44. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 27, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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proceedings before foreign domestic courts, but such immunity
would not apply in vertical proceedings before international
criminal courts.45
What transpired from the ICJ's analysis in the Arrest Warrant
Case is the emergence, 46 and in some cases the crystallization,4 7 of
a set of exceptions to the previously absolute personal immunity
CIL rule. It is true that the ICJ did not elaborate on the issue.
Nevertheless, the Court went out of its way to assert what seems to
be a principle of general support, suggesting that the very existence
of international criminal courts constitutes sufficient grounds to lift
the bar on personal immunity for high-ranking officials under these

courts' jurisdiction.
The ICJ's statement triggered extensive debate, despite its
limited dispositive value as an obiter dictum.48 The ICJ was not asked
to determine in the Arrest Warrant Case the immunities of highranking officials before an international criminal court or tribunal.
The Judges offered only a general remark which was not based on
a specific analysis of facts relating to immunities before
international criminal courts and tribunals. 49 Nevertheless, the
SCSL referred to the dictum in a decision concerning the personal
immunity of former President Charles Taylor. 50 Having established
its nature as an international criminal tribunal, 51 the SCSL found
that the immunity normally accorded to an incumbent Head of

State does not bar the exercise of jurisdiction by the SCSL.52 The
45 See ROSANNE VAN ALEBEEK, THE IMMUNITY OF STATES AND THEIR OFFICIALS
IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2008).

46. Phillip Wardle, The Survival of Head of State Immunity at the InternationalCriminalCourt,
18 AUSTL. INT'L L. J. 181, 181 (2011).

47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Jan Wouters, The

Varrant Case: Some

Judgment of

the International Court of Justice in the Arrest

Critical Remarks, 16 LEIDEN

J.

INT'L L. 253, 253 (2003); Alexander

Orakhelashvili, Arrest Warrantof lI Aprl2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 96
AM J. INT'L L. 677, 677 (2002); Antonio Cassese, When May Senior State Officials Be Triedfor
International Crimes? Some Comments on the Congo v Begium Case, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 853, 854
(2002); Steffen Wirth, Immunity for Core Crimes? The ICJ's Judgment in the Congo v Belgium Case,
13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 877, 877-78 (2002); Akande, supra note 2, at 407, 409.
49. Asad G. Kiyani, Al-Bashir & the ICC: The Problem of Head of State of State Immuniy,
12 CHINESEJ. INT'L L. 467, 492 (2013).
50. Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, SCSL-03-01-I-059, Decision on Immunity from
Jurisdiction, ¶ 42 (Special Court for Sierra Leone, May 31, 2004) [hereinafter Charles Taylor
Case].
51. Id.
52. Id. ¶ 38, 41, 53. This decision can be subject to criticism for failing to consider
the treaty-based nature of the SCSL. See Agreement on the Establishment of a Special Court
for Sierra Leone, U.N.-Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137. As such it may not
affect the immunity accorded to the incumbent Head of State of a third state, Liberia,

402

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[59:2

ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case referred to "certain international

criminal tribunals." But, beyond reference to the ICTY, ICTR, and
ICC, the IJC did not offer an exhaustive list of courts that may
exercise jurisdiction regardless of personal immunity. With no
crystallized CIL rule on the issue, the applicability of immunities is
regulated by each tribunal's constitutive instrument unless these
statutes reflect a CIL norm that personal immunity is no longer
absolute for those falling within their jurisdiction. 53
III. THE NETWORK OF ACTORS INVOLVED IN THE NORMATIVE
DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONAL IMMUNITY

If we are to explore the ways in which actors shift these norms,
it is critical to establish an analytical framework. The network of
actors responsible for the normative developments around personal
immunity for Heads of State can include states, international
organizations, non-governmental organizations, international or

domestic courts and tribunals, and even individuals. There is no
preestablished rule as to which actors may be involved in this
network for the descriptive purposes of exploring the sources of its
normative effect. Configuring the relationships among the actors,
or, as we will call them, nodes, will help us map how the network
affects the normative development of personal immunity
internationally as well as measure the resulting legislative effect of
each node individually and of the network as a whole. 54

A. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals
The
first explicit articulation
of individual
criminal
responsibility for international crimes is found in Article 7 of the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, which

&

without that state's waiver of immunity. See Akande, supra note 2, at 417-18; see also Sarah
Nouwen, The Special Courtfor Sierra Leone and the Immunity of Taylor: The Arrest Warrant Case
Continued, 18 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 654 (2005); Zsuzsanna Deen-Racsmany, Prosecutorv Taylor:
The Status of the Special CourtforSierraLeone and Its ImplicationsforImmuniy, 18 LEIDEN J. INT'L
L. 299 (2005).
53. Dan Terzian, Personal Immuniy and President Omar Al Bashir: An Analysis Under
Customay InternationalLaw and Secu 4 Council Resolution 1593, 16 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR.
AFF. 279, 287 (2011); Ilias Bantekas, Head of State Immuniy in the Lbght ofMultiple Legal Regimes
and Non-Self-Contained System Theories, 10 J. CONFLICT SEC. L. 21, 27 (2005).
54 David Lazer, Networks and Politics: The Case of Human Rihts, in UNDERSTANDING
SOCIAL ACTION, PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS 244, 245 (Ryan Goodman, Derek Jinks,
Andrew K. Woods eds., 2012).
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states that "the official position of defendants, whether as Heads of
State or responsible officials in government departments, shall not
be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating
punishment." 55 This was later emphasized by the Tribunal in its
judgment, where it explained that "the principle of International
Law
which,
under
certain
circumstances,
protects
the
representatives of a state cannot be applied to acts condemned as
criminal by International Law. The authors of these acts cannot
shelter themselves behind their official position to be freed from
punishment." 56 In dismissing the same argument on immunities, the
Military Tribunal for the Far East, otherwise known as the Tokyo

Tribunal, made direct reference to the Nuremberg Judgment and
declared:
In view of the fact that in all material respects the Charters
of this Tribunal and the Nuremberg Tribunal are identical,
this Tribunal prefers to express its unqualified adherence to
the relevant opinions of the Nuremberg Tribunal rather
than by reasoning the matters anew in somewhat different
language to open the door to controversy by way of
conflicting interpretations of the two statements of
opinions. 57
On December 11, 1946, the United Nations General Assembly

(UNGA) unanimously adopted Resolution 95(1) affirming both the
principles of International Law reflected in the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal as well as the judgment of the Tribunal. By
means of Resolution 177(II), the UNGA asked the International
Law Commission (ILC) to systematically formulate and elaborate
on the principles contained in the Nuremberg Charter. When the
ILC was considering them, it discussed whether it was within the
scope of its mandate to ascertain if the principles constituted
principles of international law 58 The ILC concluded that, since the
Nuremberg Principles had already been affirmed by the UNGA in
55. Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major war Criminals of the European Axis art. 7, Fr.U.K.-Un. of Soviet Soc. Rep.-U.S., Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 59 Stat. 1544 [hereinafter
London Charter] ("The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or
responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them
from responsibility or mitigating punishment.").
56. Alan Bullock, The Trial of German Major War Criminals: Proceedings of the International
Militay Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg in Germany Part XXII, 27 INT'L AFF. 503 (1951)
(summarizing the trials in Aug. 1946 and Oct. 1946).
57. International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Judgment, chp. 2(a), Nov. 4, 1948.
58. See Secretariat Memorandum, supra note 10.
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Resolution 96(1), its task was not to express its appreciation of them
but to formulate them with a focus on their substantive elements.
On the issue of immunities, the ILC adopted Principle III based
on Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter. "He who violates the laws
of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the
authority of the State if the State in authorizing action moves
outside its competence under International Law" 5 9 In other words,
the official capacity in which an agent of a state acts does not justify
crimes against peace, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, or
"[t]he fact that a person committed an act which constitutes a crime

under International Law acted as a Head of State or responsible
Government official does not relieve him from responsibility under
international law" 60 The UNGA accepted by Resolution 488(V) the
principles formulated by the ILC based on the Nuremberg Charter,
thus codifying its proposals for individual criminal responsibility
and a code of crimes protecting the security of mankind. 61

B.

The InternationalCriminalTribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia

Nearly fifty years after these developments, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was the first
international criminal court to hold high-level officials criminally
liable for international crimes performed on behalf of a state.
UNSC Resolution 80862 had requested the UNSG to report on the
legal basis for the establishment of an International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia. 63 In his report, the UNSG states:
It should be pointed out that, in assigning to the
International Tribunal the task of prosecuting persons
responsible
for serious violations of international
humanitarian law, the Security Council would not be
creating or purporting to "legislate" the law. Rather, the
International Tribunal would have the task of applying
existing international humanitarian law64

59. Id.
60. Principles of InternationalLaw recognized in the Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunaland in the
Judgment ofthe Tribunal, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/25.
61. Draft Code of Crimes Against Peace and Security of Mankind, [1996] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 26, U.N. Doc. A/43/10 ("The official position of an individual who commits a
crime against the peace and security of mankind, even if he acted as Head of State or
Government, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility or mitigate punishment.").
62. S.C. Res. 808, ¶ 2 (Feb. 22, 1993).
63. Rep. of the S.C., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1996).
64. Id. at 8.
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This rationale was applied not only to acts for which an official
bore individual criminal responsibility but also to the offenses
included in the Statute of the Tribunal. The UNSG Report
confirms that an individual alleged to have committed actions that
would fall within the crimes covered by the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal may be prosecuted even if the act was performed on
behalf of a state. The ICTY Statute provides that the official
position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or
government or as a responsible government official, "shall not
relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate
punishment." 65 This was stipulated as existing international law at
the time for the purposes of the ICTY and the way the court was
to handle the potential immunity claims of the indicted individuals.
The ICTY considered personal immunity as a bar for

prosecution for the first time in Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic.66
During the proceedings, amici curiae argued that the tribunal lacked

jurisdiction to try Milosevic due to his status as President. The
argument was that the Statute of the Tribunal, and Article 7 in
particular, could not override existing principles of CIL that

accorded him Head of State immunity.67 The Trial Chamber not
only dismissed this argument but also established that Article 7 of
the ICTY Statute reflected CIL.68 It based this finding on Article IV
of the Convention for the Prevention and the Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Principle III of the Nuremberg Principles,
Article 6(2) of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone,
Article 7 of the ILC's Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, and Article 27 of the Rome Statute of the
ICC, all of which preclude official immunity.69 This was the first act
of an international criminal court after Nuremberg and Tokyo
confirming the diminished importance of official capacity in
international criminal proceedings.
The ICTY applied this principle in subsequent cases. The
Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Blaskic, for instance, emphasized
that "those responsible for [war crimes, crimes against humanity and
genocide] cannot invoke immunity from national or international
65. S.C. Res. 827 (July 7, 2009) (amended, S.C. Res. 1877 (2009)).
67. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. ICTY-IT-02-54, Decision on Preliminary
Motions, ¶ 27 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Nov. 8, 2001) [hereinafter
Milosevic, ICTY, Preliminary Motions].
67. Id.

68. Id. ¶ 28.
69. Id. ¶ 29-32.
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jurisdiction even if they perpetrated such crimes while acting in
their official capacity."70 In Prosecutor v. FurunditYa it held that
"individuals are personally responsible, whatever their official
position, even if they are Heads of State or government
ministers." 71 And this in Prosecutorv. Kunarac
... [T]he doctrine of "act of State," by which an individual
would be shielded from criminal responsibility for an act he
or she committed in the name of or as an agent of a state,
is no defense under international criminal law. This has been
the case since the Second World War, if not before. Articles
1 and 7 of the Statute make it clear that the identity and
official status of the perpetrator is irrelevant insofar as it
relates to accountability. 72

C. The Special Courtfor SierraLeone
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) took a similar view
in its proceedings against the former Head of State of Liberia,
Charles Taylor. Taylor challenged the jurisdiction of the Court on
the basis that the indictment was issued while he was still in office
and thus he was protected by the personal immunity afforded to
Heads of State in international law. 73 The Appeals Chamber
dismissed this argument, relying on the Statutes of the Nuremberg

and Tokyo Tribunals, the ICTY, ICTR, and the Rome Statute, as
well as the Arrest Warrant Case and the Pinochet Cases. The
Chamber first established that the SCSL was an "international
tribunal," 74 then confirmed that immunity derives from the
principle of state equality but that simply "does not prevent a Head
of State from being prosecuted before an international criminal
tribunal or court." 75 The SCSL established that there was an

70. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-9-14-A, Judgment on the Request of the
Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, ¶ 41
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 29, 1997).
71. Prosecutor v. Furundija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 140 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998).
72. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 494 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001).
73. Charles Taylor Case, supranote 50, ¶ 6.

74. Id.

¶ 42.

75. Id. ¶ 52. The Court's judgment drew from and approved the submissions of amici
curiae Philippe Sands, Alison McDonald, and Diane Orentlicher. The former argued that
"[i]nternational practise and a majority of academic commentary supports the view that... an
international criminal court or tribunal (whether or not it has been established under
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inherent difference between domestic and international courts for
the purposes of prosecuting highly ranked state officials. While
immunities have a place in domestic courts, where, under the
principle of state equality, one state may not adjudicate the conduct
of another, international tribunals "are not organs of a state but
derive their mandate from the international community." 76 Thus,
the reason for immunity in the first place fades away before
international tribunals. This caused many to argue that a CIL
exception to normal principles of personal immunity for Heads of
State exists for international crimes within the jurisdiction of

international courts and tribunals. 77
D. The InternationalCriminal Court
The ICC was established by the Rome Statute, which is a treaty.
The Rome Statute's central provision regarding immunities is
Article 27, which was adopted relatively easily and with no
considerable debate at the Rome Conference. 78 The first paragraph
of Article 27 of the Rome Statute provides that "the international
law doctrine of functional immunity and of national legislation
sheltering State officials with immunity for official acts" may not be

used in order to avoid individual criminal responsibility, or to
mitigate punishment. 79 Article 27(2) further provides that
"immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the
official capacity of a person, whether under national or international

Chapter VII of the UN Charter) may exercise jurisdiction over a serving Head of State and
that such person is not entitled to claim immunity under customary international law in
respect of international crimes." Id.
76. Secretariat Memorandum, supra note 10, ¶ 72.
77. Sophie Papillon, Has the United Nations Securiy Council Implicitly RemovedAl Bashir's
Immuni?, 10 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 275, 280 (2010); Michael Frulli, Are Crimes Against
Humanii More Serous Than War Cmes?, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 329 (2001).
78. Per Saland, IntenationalCrminalLaw Princples,in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 189, 202 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999); see also
U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International

Criminal Court Report of the PreparatoyCommittee on the Establishmentof an InternationalCriminal
Court, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/2/Add.1 (Apr. 14, 1998) [hereinafter U.N. Conference on

the ICC].
79. Gaeta, Official Capacty and Immunities, supranote 8, at 978; see also Dapo Akande, The
Application of InternationalLaw Immunities in Prosecutionsfor InternationalCrimes, in BRINGING
POWER TOJUSTICE? THE PROSPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 47, 59

(Michael Milde et al. eds., 2006) (arguing that Article 27(1) eliminates the affirmative defense
of immunity based on official position).
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law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such
a person." 80
Several aspects of this provision are important. First, the
provision concretizes similar provisions from other international
criminal courts and tribunals by establishing that immunities will not
apply whether they derive from international or national law. 81
Second, the wording of the second paragraph implies that the
provision is intended to address only personal immunities, as such
immunities "attach to the official capacity" of a person, whereas
functional immunity attaches to the acts involved and not the office
held by the person. 82 Article 27 read as a whole results in the
removal of all immunities held by an individual before the ICC
irrespective of their office. 83 According to Article 27, the states that
have ratified the Rome Statute have agreed to waive their right to
the procedural immunities that they had under CIL.
This is a strong expression of general practice and opiniojuris.
But insofar as the exception to immunities before international
criminal courts and tribunals has not reached CIL level, the Rome
Statute may create rights and obligations only for the states party to
the treaty and not for third states without their express consent. 84
This means that states have to opt into Article 27 by ratification of
the Rome Statute. 85 Immunity that has been waived continues to
normatively exist, which is the reason why courts and tribunals have
specifically sought to exclude immunity by carving out an exception
within their proceedings.
An important issue at the Rome Conference was the need to
consider the relationship between existing state obligations, such as

Rome Statute, supranote 44, at art. 27(2).
81. Similar provisions maybe found in the Special Proclamation for the Establishment
of an International Military Tribunal for the Far East art. 6, Jan. 19, 1946, T.J.A.S. 1589;
S.C. Res. 955, art. 6(2) (1994) (establishing a tribunal for crimes committed in Rwanda); S.C.
Res. 827 (1993) (same but for Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 1315 (2002) (same but for Sierra
Leone); the London Agreement, supra note 55. Article 27(1) of the Rome Statute also
contains a similar provision. See Rome Statute, supranote 44. Commentators, however, have
suggested that it is intended to prevent the substantive defense that an official acted in an
official capacity when committing a crime and is not a rule as to the applicability of
international law immunities. See Sarah Williams & Lena Sherif, The Arrest Warrantfor
Presidental-B ashir:Immunities of Incumbent Heads of state and the InternationalCriminalCourt, 143.
CONFLICT & SEC. L. 71, 77 n.39 (2009).
82. Gaeta, supra note 8, at 978.
83. Blommestijn & Ryngaert, supranote 22, at 437.
84. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter Treaty on Treaties].
85. Williams & Sherif, supranote 81, at 77-78.
80
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bilateral extradition treaties or the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, on the one hand, and obligations deriving

from the Rome Statute on the other.86 The drafters tried to address
this through Article 98 barring requests for surrender or assistance
that would require the requested state to act inconsistently with its
obligations under international law with respect to the state or
diplomatic immunity, unless that third state waived the immunity. 87
According to the ILC, Article 98 does not serve the purpose of
granting immunity from prosecution before the ICC.88 Instead, it
places an obligation on the ICC to not put a state in a situation
where it would have to violate an already existing international
obligation relating to immunity.89
Article 27 has largely been interpreted as a waiver by state
parties of immunities that would otherwise apply, limiting the
application of Article 98 "to the case of officials from a state that is
not a party to the Rome Statute." 90 The basis of this is that the effect

of Article 27(2) would be nullified if Article 98(1) applied to state
parties. Under the principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation,
"the removal of immunity in Article 27 must be understood as
applying not only in relation to the ICC itself, but also in relation to
states acting at the request of the ICC."91 Another interpretation
86. Proposal Submitted by Singapore, Preparatory Committee on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court, A/AC.249/WP.40 (1996), http://www.legaltools.org/doc/eb34fa/; see also Kimberly Prost & Angelika Schlunck, Article 98, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

1131, 1131-33 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999) (discussing the interplay between Articles 27 and
98).
87. See Rome Statute, supra note 44, at art. 98 ("1. The Court may not proceed with a
request for surrender or assistance which would require the requested State to act
inconsistently with its obligations under international law...2. The Court may not proceed
with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act inconsistently
with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a
sending State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court...").
88. See Prost & Schlunk, supranote 86, at 1131.
89. Id.
90. BRUCE BROOMHALL,

INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURT: BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 145 (2003); W.A.
SCHABAS, INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 64 (2001); Steffen

Wirth, Immunities, Related Problems andArticle 98 of the Rome Statute, 12 CRIM. L.F. 429, 452-54
(2001); Gaeta, supra note 8, at 993-96; Akande, supranote 2, at 425.
91. See, e.g., Akande, supra note 2, at 423-24 ("[A]n interpretation that allows officials
of states parties to rely on international law immunities when they are in other states would
deprive the Statute of its stated purpose of preventing impunity and ensuring that the most
serious crimes of international concern do not go unpunished. Furthermore, the removal
of immunity from the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction contained in Article 27 would be
nullified in practice if Article 98(1) were interpreted as allowing parties to rely on the same
immunities in order to prevent the surrender of their officials to the Court by other states.").
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argues that the wording "third states" of Article 98 ought to be

understood as referring to non-state parties to the ICC.92 This
means that the ICC recognizes the obligation prescribed under
Article 98 only in respect to non-state parties. 93 This interpretation
effectively creates a bifurcated immunity system within the ICC: one
system for officials from state parties, and one for officials from
non-state parties. Officials from state parties would not enjoy any
kind of immunity before the ICC by virtue of Article 27. Non-state
parties' officials could retain their immunity under Article 98(1) as
their states have not, as a matter of treaty law, waived their rights to
immunities, and their arrest and surrender may only take place if
"the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for
the waiver of the immunity." 94 The upshot is the same in any case:
state parties to the treaty have waived immunity for their officials
regarding crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC.

1.

The InternationalCriminalCourt Pre-TrialChamber

Immunities came up in the ICC for the first time on July 14,
2008, when the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) requested the PreTrial Chamber (PTC) of the ICC to issue an arrest warrant against

the incumbent president of Sudan, Omar Hassan al-Bashir.95 On
the basis of the evidence presented to it, the PTC granted the
This is supported by the principle that "[a]n interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that
would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility."
Id. Thus, the removal of immunity in Article 27 must be understood as applying not only in
relation to the ICC itself but also in relation to states acting at the request of the ICC.
92. Gaeta, supra note 8, at 993-94.
93. The PTC confirmed this in Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09195, Decision on the Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Regarding
Omar Al Bashir's Arrest and Surrender to the Court, ¶ 27 (Apr. 9, 2014) ("It follows that
when the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court entails the prosecution of a Head of State
of a non-State Party, the question of personal immunities might validly arise. The solution
provided for in the Statute to resolve such a conflict is found in Article 98(1) of the Statute.
This provision directs the Court to secure the cooperation of the third State for the waiver
or lifting the immunity of its Head of State. This course of action envisaged by Article
98(1) of the Statute aims at preventing the requested State from acting inconsistently with
its international obligations towards the non-State Party with respect to the immunities
attached to the latter's Head of State.").
94. See Rome Statute, supra note 44.
95. See Press Release, International Criminal Court, ICC Prosecutor Presents Case
Against Sudanese President, Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, for Genocide, Crimes Against
Humanity and War Crimes in Darfur, ICC-OTP-20080714-PR341 (July 14, 2008); see also
Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on Prosecutor's Application for
Warrant of Arrest Under Article 58 Against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Mar. 4, 2009)
[hereinafter al-Bashir Case].
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application in part. 96 The PTC was satisfied that there were

reasonable grounds to believe al -Bashir had committed a crime
within the jurisdiction of the ICC, and that the Court could exercise
its jurisdiction over him. 97 Although this was not the first time that

an arrest warrant had been issued against a Head of State before an
international criminal court and tribunal, it was the first time that an

arrest warrant was executed against an incumbent Head of State.
Neither Milosevic nor Taylor were serving Heads of State when
they were brought before the respective international tribunals. 98
The arrest warrant of al-Bashir implicated two unresolved issues:
the immunity of an incumbent and the immunity of a Head of State
of a non-state party to the ICC.

The PTC addressed the issue of al-Bashir's immunities on four
principle arguments and concluded that al-Bashir's official position
"has no effect on the Court's jurisdiction over the present case." 99
First, it referred to the object and purpose of the Rome Statute by
means of its preamble, that is, to end impunity for the perpetrators
of the most egregious international crimes. Second, in order for the
Statute to be effective and achieve those goals, the PTC referred to
Articles 27 (1) and (2) of the Rome Statute as incorporating three
principles: (1) that the Rome Statute "shall apply equally to all
persons without any distinction based on official capacity;" 100 (2)
that official capacity does not exempt a person from individual
criminal responsibility before the Court; 01 and (3) that immunities
shall not bar the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC.102 Third, the
PTC noted that, according to the jurisprudence of the Court, the
additional sources of law provided for in Article 21(1)(b) and (c)
including other treaties, CIL, and general principles of international
law are only to be resorted to when there is a legal lacuna in the
Statute and the legal framework of the Court, and when such lacuna
96. al-Bashir Case, supra not 95.
97. See Rome Statue, supra note 44. The PTC decided that the arrest of al-Bashir was
necessary under all three parts of this test. See al-Bashir Case, supranote 95.
98. Slobodan Milosevic, President of Yugoslavia, was first indictedby the ICTY while
in office. See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37, Indictment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the former Yugoslavia May 22, 1999). Charles Taylor, President of Liberia, was also indcted
by the SCSL while in office. See Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT263, Second Amended Indictment (Special Ct. for Sierra Leone Mar. 3, 2003). So too was
President Milutinvoc. See Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Case No. IT-05-87, Indictment (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia May 22 ,1999).
99. al-Bashir Case supra note 96, ¶ 41.

100. Id. ¶ 42-43.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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may not be cured by applying the general rules of treaty
interpretation. 103 Finally, the PTC took note of the role of the

UNSC and argued that, by referring the Sudan situation to the ICC,
the UNSC accepted that any proceeding investigation and
prosecution is to take place according to ICC's legal framework. 104
Despite having established in several instances that immunities,
and personal immunity in particular, do not bar the Court's
jurisdiction, it is unclear whether Article 27 of the Rome Statute
represents a comprehensive CIL norm or simply a conventional
rule. The prevailing assumption is that the PTC believes CIL has
already changed with respect to immunities before international
criminal courts and tribunals, and that it is applying this law. In
finding jurisdiction over Heads of State, the PTC has referenced
several texts and precedents it finds relevant. These include the 1919
Report of the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of
the War, the statues of the previous international criminal courts

and tribunals, and the ICJ Arrest Warrant decision. 105
Beyond the case of al-Bashir, the PTC has denied immunity
before international criminal courts and tribunals for Laurent

Gbagbo,

Muammar

Gaddafi,

Charles

Taylor,

and Slobodan

Milosevi6. Out of these four examples the last three are more
straightforward regarding the court's jurisdiction. In the case of

Gaddafi, the situation in Libya had been referred to the ICC by the
UNSC under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute granting jurisdiction
to the Court. This was despite the fact that the situation concerned
the alleged criminal liability of nationals of a state that is not party
to the Statute, and crimes committed in the territory of a state that
is not party to the Statute. 106 In justifying jurisdiction, the PTC made
note of its earlier findings in the al-Bashir Case regarding the
irrelevance of an individual's official position for the purposes of

the Court's jurisdiction, and concluded that Gaddafi's case fell
within the jurisdiction of the ICC.107 Charles Taylor was also a
sitting Head of State at the time of his indictment even though he

103. Id. ¶ 44.
104. Id. ¶ 45.
105. Comm'n on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement
of Penalties, Report Presented to the Pre-iminay Peace Conference, 14 AM. J. INT'L L 95, 116-17
(1920); see also 2000 Arrest Warrant Case, supranote 7.
106. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-12, Decision on the Prosecutor's Application
Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Muhammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam
Gaddafi and Abdullah al-Senussi, ¶ 9 (June 27, 2011).

107. Id.

¶ 10.
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had been out of office for almost three years at the time of his arrest

and surrender to the

SCSL.108

Milosevic was a sitting Head of State

at the time of his indictment as well, 109 but had already lost his
reelection bid, resigned as President of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, and had been arrested on charges of
domestic corruption and abuse of power 110 at the time the ICTY
reissued an warrant for his arrest.11 1
Gbagbo's example is quite different to the above regarding the
issue of contested immunity. Unlike the situations in Libya and

Sudan, the ICC did not rely on a UNSC Resolution to exercise
jurisdiction over the situation in Cote d' Ivoire. Instead, the state
itself in April 2003 declared its ad hoc acceptance of ICC

jurisdiction "sans retard et sans exception" 112 and reiterated this
unconditional acceptance up to nearly a year before Gbagbo was
arrested in 2011.113 The effect of such acceptance is to render all
provisions of the Statute applicable to Gbagbo, including Article
27(2) of the Rome Statute that operates as an explicit waiver of an
official's immunity by state parties to the Statute. Indictments

against individuals whose immunity has been waived by their own
state would appear to be in line even with older conceptions of the
CIL rules on immunities. But the issue of whether Article 27(2)
restates an existing CIL rule remains contested.

108. A sealed indictment was issued in Mar. 2003. See Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor,
SCSL-03-01-PT-263, Indictment (Special Ct. for Sierra Leone Mar. 3, 2003). Taylor resigned
as President of Liberia on Aug. 11, 2003, and was not arrested until Mar. 29, 2006.
109. One of his contemporaries, Milan Milutinovi6, was also indicted while serving as
President of Serbia. However, Milutinovi surrendered to the ICTY after his term ended in
2002, and did not raise immunity as an issue during his trial. See Prosecutor v. Sainovi6, Case
No. IT-05-87, Decision on Milutinovi Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 10 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the former Yugoslavia May 22, 2007).
110. Milosevi6 lost to Vojislav Kostunica. While his term was not set to end until June
2001, he resigned on Oct. 7, 2000, after public protests due to manipulation of electoral
results by his allies. See Steven Erlanger, Showdown in Yugoslavia: The Overview; Milosevic Concedes
His Defeat; Yugoslavs Celebrate New Era, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
7,
2000),
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/07/world/showdown-yugoslavia-overviewmilosevic-concedes-his-defeat-yugoslavs-celebrate.html.
111. The warrants were re-issued on Jan. 22, 2001. See Press Release, International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Milosevic and Others Case: Warrants Reissued to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, U.N. Press Release SJP/P.I.S./557-e (Jan. 23,
2001).
112. That self-referral was for any crimes that had been committed during an armed
rebellion against Gbagbo's rule that started on Sept. 19, 2002. See D6claration de
Reconnaissance de la Competence de la Cour Penale Internationale [Letter from Bamba
Mamadou, Minister of State, to the ICC] (April 18, 2003).
113. On Dec. 14, 2010, Alassane Ouattara, President of Cote d'Ivoire, confirmed the
State's ongoing acceptance of ICC jurisdiction. See Confirmation de la D6claration de
Reconnaissance [Letter from Alassane Ouattara, President, to the ICC] (Dec. 14, 2010).
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State Cooperation

In addition to indictments, which serve as the first step through
which the ICC exercises its jurisdiction over individuals, the Rome
Statute also requires the cooperation of states in order to arrest and
surrender them to the Court. In addressing the obligations of states
regarding arrest and surrender, the PTC has made its perhaps most
unequivocal findings on the issue of immunities for Heads of State
and the Court's jurisdiction. It has not only reinforced its original

decisions on issuing the indictments, but has also elaborated on its
consideration regarding the CIL nature of the rules on immunity
before international criminal courts and tribunals.
In the case of al-Bashir, the Court has had to demand the
cooperation of states on multiple instances due to the case's
complicated nature and al-Bashir's general disregard for the Court's
orders. Despite the indictment against him, al-Bashir frequently
exercised his Head of State visits to other states, thus presenting
multiple instances in which the international community sought the
cooperation of third states in his arrest. In its decision on the
cooperation of the DRC regarding al-Bashir's arrest and surrender,
the PTC elaborated on where the Court stands on the issue of
immunity. In response to the DRC's concerns of being "guided by
the principle of immunity," 11 4 the PTC found that the DRC not only

ignored the requests issued by the Court for arrest and surrender
but also did not discharge its obligation to notify or consult with the
Court. 115 In response to the DRC's argument that it had to "wonder
about the decision it should take," 116 the PTC made clear that
"nowhere in any decision issued by the Court is there the slightest
ambiguity about the Chambers' legal position regarding Omar alBashir's arrest and surrender to the Court, despite the arguments
117
invoked relating to his immunity under international law."

But the PTC did not stop here. In addressing the DRC's
arguments on the issue of immunities and competing obligations, it
stated that, while immunities for sitting Heads of State are

114. Prosecutor v. al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-195, Decision on the Cooperation of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo Regarding Omar Al Bashir's Arrest and Surrender
to the Court (Apr. 9, 2014) [hereinafter al-Bashir Case, DRC Cooperation].

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id

¶ 21.
¶ 22.
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undisputed before domestic courts, an exception to the personal
immunities of Heads of State is explicitly provided in Article 27(2)
of the Rome Statute for prosecution before an internationalcriminal
jurisdiction. 118 However, the PTC noted that there is a question sub
judice regarding how far this provision extends and whether it applies
to non-state parties in this case Sudan. To resolve this question,
the PTC turned to the UNSC Resolution 1593, which stated that
"the government of Sudan... shall cooperate fully with and provide
any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant
to this resolution." 119 It argued that immunities represent a
procedural bar, and since the cooperation requested by the UNSC
incorporates the elimination of all impediments to the proceedings
before the Court that would otherwise not allow Sudan to
"cooperate fully" 120 and "provide any necessary assistance to the
Court," 121 it eliminates such procedural bars. Thus, what the PTC
effectively argued is that the UNSC implicitly waived immunities
granted to al-Bashir under International Law that are attached to his
position as Head of State for the purposes of the ICC
proceedings. 122

The PTC came to similar decisions regarding the non-executed
arrest warrants against al-Bashir on the part of Kenya. It reiterated
that the enforcement obligation of the arrest warrants stems from
UNSC Resolution 1593 that "urge[d] all States and concerned
regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully"
with the ICC,123 and Article 87 of the Rome Statute to which Kenya
is party.124 The PTC also noted in response to Chad's refusal to
arrest al-Bashir that it is under the obligation of the Rome Statute,
to which it is a party, to execute the pending Court's decisions on

his arrest and surrender to the Court.125 The PTC also noted that
Chad, contrary to Article 97, avoided consultations with the Court

118. Id.
119.
120.
121.
122.

¶ 25.

S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 2 (Mar. 31, 2005).
Id.
Id.
al-Bashir Case, DRC Cooperation, supra note 114,

¶ 29.

123. S.C. Res. 1593, supranote 119, ¶ 2.
124. Prosecutor v. al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-107, Decision Informing the United
Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome Statute About
Omar Al-Bashir's presence in the Territory of the Republic of Kenya (Aug. 27, 2010).
125 . Prosecutor v. al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-151, Decision on the NonCompliance of the Republic of Chad with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court
Regarding the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, ¶ 20 (Mar. 26,
2013).

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

416

[59:2

prior to al-Bashir's visits in order to resolve any issues concerning
the execution of the cooperation requests. Chad deliberately
disregarded both its obligations stemming from the Rome Statute
and UNSC Resolution 1593.126 The PTC followed the same
rationale concerning Nigeria's inaction on the execution of the

cooperation requests due to al-Bashir's "sudden departure" before
the official closing of the AU Summit. According to Nigerian
authorities this happened at the time when "officials of relevant
bodies and agencies of...Nigeria were considering the necessary
steps to be taken in respect of his visit in line with Nigeria's
international obligations." 127
The PTC has also dealt with the issue of non-cooperation from
non-state parties. It found that, although Qatar had no obligations

towards the Court from the Rome Statute, the Sudan situation was
referred by UNSC Resolution 1593 urging all states to cooperate
with the Court and could thus execute the outstanding arrest
warrant. 128
The PTC made its most elaborate finding regarding the nature
of the CIL rules on immunity before international criminal courts
and tribunals in its decisions regarding Malawi's noncooperation.
After it reiterated Malawi's obligations to cooperate under both the

Statute and the UNSC Chapter VII Resolution, the PTC addressed
Malawi's arguments on whether sitting Heads of States of non-state
parties enjoy immunities in the enforcement of ICC arrest warrants
by national authorities. The PTC found that:
The principle in International Law is that immunity of
either former or sitting Heads of State cannot be invoked
to oppose a prosecution by an international court. This is
equally applicable to former or sitting Heads of State not
Parties to the Statute whenever the Court may exercise
jurisdiction. 129

126. Id.

¶ 21.

127. Prosecutor v. al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-159, Decision on the Cooperation of
the Federal Republic of Nigeria Regarding Omar Al-Bashir's Arrest and Surrender to the
Court, ¶ 7-12 (Sept. 9, 2013).
128. Prosecutor v. al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-204, Decision on the "Prosecution's
Urgent Notification of Travel in the Case of The Prosecutor v Omar Al Bashir," ¶¶ 8, 11
(July 7, 2014).
129. Prosecutor v. al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-139-Corr, Corrigendum to the
Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of
Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the
Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶ 36 (Dec. 13, 2011).
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It even added that the PTC considers "the international
community's commitment to rejecting immunity in circumstances
where international courts seek arrest for international crimes has
reached a critical mass" 130 and that "it is certainly no longer
appropriate to say that customary international law immunity
applies in the present context." 131 In a conclusive finding, the PTC
declared that there is a CIL exception to Head of State immunity
before ICCTs and thus there is no conflict between Malawi's

obligations toward the Court and its obligations under customary
international law.132
On June 13, 2015, al-Bashir visited South Africa to attend the
AU Summit. The South Africa High Court issued an order that alBashir was not to leave the country. Yet, as the Court deliberated,
he was already on his way back to Sudan on a private jet. The PTC
had already issued an urgent decision asserting that there was "no
ambiguity or uncertainty" with regard to South Africa's obligation
to arrest al-Bashir,133 by referencing the Court's jurisprudential
history on issues of non-cooperation. 134 In the South African High
Court's ruling, the Court confirmed that South Africa's obligations
under the Rome Statute trump its obligations to the AU. It found
governmental officials responsible for a "clear violation of the
order," 135 and that the argument that the duty to cooperate with the

ICC had been suspended by al-Bashir's immunity was "ill-advised
and ill-founded" 136 and "misguided." 137 It concluded that the

130. Id. ¶ 42.
131. Id.

132. Id.

¶ 43.

133 . Prosecutor v. al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-242, Decision Following the
Prosecutor's Request for an Order Further Clarifying that the Republic of South Africa is
Under the Obligation to Immediately Arrest and Surrender Omar Al Bashir, ¶ 1 (June 13,
2015).
134. See id. at ¶ 9. The Chamber held that it was unnecessary to further clarify that
South Africa is obliged to arrest al-Bashir and surrender him to the Court given that "the
Republic of South Africa is already aware of its obligation under the Rome Statute to
immediately arrest Omar Al-Bashir and surrender him to the Court, as it is aware of the
Court's explicit position ...
that the immunities granted to Omar Al-Bashir under
international law and attached to his position as a Head of State have been implicitly waived
by the Security Council of the United Nations by resolution 1593(2005) referring the
situation in Darfur, Sudan to the Prosecutor of the Court, and that the Republic of South
Africa cannot invoke any other decision, including that of the African Union, providing for
any obligation to the contrary." Id.
135. S. Afr. itg. Ctr. v. Minister of Justice & ConstitutionalDev. 2015 (5) SA 1 (GP) at 7
¶ 9 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter SALC v. MoJ et al.].

136. Id. at 25
137. Id. at 26

¶ 31.
¶ 32.
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government had acted in breach of the South African
Constitution, 138 the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the

International Criminal Court Act, and the Rome Statute, and invited
the National Prosecuting Authority "to consider whether criminal
proceedings are appropriate." 139 The South African Supreme Court
of Appeal unanimously confirmed that the South African
government had breached its obligations under the South African
domestic statute implementing the Rome Statute, and under the
Rome Statute, by failing to arrest and detain al-Bashir for surrender
to the ICC.140

3.

The Assembly of State Parties:States

The ICC, apart from its judicial organs, is also
comprised of other governing entities. The Assembly of State
Parties (ASP) is the body responsible for the management and
oversight of the Court, and the legislative body comprised of the
state parties to the Rome Statute. States that have only signed the
Rome Statute but have not yet ratified it may participate as

observers. The ICC is also unique in incorporating NGOs under
Coalition for the ICC (CICC) that have accreditation and participate
actively in the sessions of the ASP. At its yearly meetings, the ASP
discusses both logistical and substantive issues relating to the
functioning of the Court. Naturally, the issue of immunity has been
discussed both in the panels for amendments to the Rome Statute
and the Court's Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as well as the
considerations of questions of non-cooperation with the Court.
Though at the ASP the states involved are already party to the Rome

Statute and have prima facie consented to its substantive and
procedural rules, a review of how they interpret their obligations

and those of third states is instructive in better understanding the
role of this network in shaping the CIL rules on personal immunity.
At the ASP, several states have expressed their position on the
issue of immunities. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (CANZ)
have responded to the non-execution of al-Bashir's arrest warrants

by calling upon:

138. S. AFR. CONST., 1996.
139. SALC v. Moj et al., supra note 135, ¶ 39.
140. Ministerof justce & ConstitutionalD ev. v. S. Afr.
at 72 ¶ 107 (S. Afr.).

itig.

Ctr. 2016 (867/15) SA 1 (S CA)
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[A]ll relevant actors, including the authorities in Uganda and
the Democratic Republic of Congo, to cooperate closely
with the Court and with one another in ensuring the full
implementation of their obligations under the Rome
Statute, including the execution of the outstanding arrest
warrants, and assisting the Court to fulfill its mandate. 141
They have also reiterated every year to Sudan their urge to
"cooperate with the Court and to take all necessary steps to arrest
[wanted individuals]" and "to help bring an end to impunity for
alleged human rights abuses and war crimes." 142
The EU has repeatedly called upon state parties "to comply
unreservedly with the obligations they entered into when they

ratified the Court Statute and . .

States which have not yet acceded

to act in accordance with the Security Council resolutions which, let
us not forget, are binding on them." 1 4 3 The EU has also seized the
opportunity to repeat to the government of Sudan that it is "obliged
under the terms of United Nations Security Council Resolution
1593 to cooperate with the Court. That obligation is not
negotiable." 144 The EU along with several candidate states such as
Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Iceland,
as well as the Countries of the Stabilization and Association Process
and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Montenegro, Serbia, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Armenia
and Georgia, have been very vocal concerning the enforcement of
arrest warrants due to immunity. "The Union calls for more focused
efforts from the States Parties, in line with their cooperation
obligations, and from the international community as a whole, to
prevent the alleged perpetrators of genocide, crimes against
humanity or war crimes from escaping justice any longer." 145 On the
obligations of states not party to the Court the EU "points out that
UN Security Council Resolution 1593 imposes obligations not least
on a non-State Party-Sudan-to cooperate with the Court. It regrets
Sudan's infringements of its international obligations and expresses

141. ICC, General Debate, Seventh Sess. of the Assembly of States Parties, Statement
of Australia on behalf of Canada, New Zealand and Australia at 2 (Nov. 15, 2008).
142. ICC, General Debate, Eighth Sess. of the Assembly of States Parties, Statement
of Canada, Australia and New Zealand at 1 (Nov. 19, 2009).
143. ICC, General Debate, Seventh Sess. of the Assembly of States Parties, Statement
of France on behalf of the European Union at ¶ 6 (Nov. 14, 2008).

144. Id.

¶ 10.

145. ICC, General Debate, Ninth Sess. of the Assembly of States Parties, Statement
of Belgium on behalf of the European Union at 6 (Dec. 6, 2010).
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concern about the difficulties recently raised by two States Parties
in relation to the performance of their cooperation obligations." 146
Hungary has viewed recent developments in international
criminal justice as evidence that "the fight against impunity and the
strengthened international cooperation to continue preventing the
most serious crimes are more important than ever." 14 7 Lichtenstein

has called "on all States concerned to abide by their obligations
under international law and to cooperate fully with the Court. States
Parties have a special obligation in this regard, as does the Security
Council with respect to situations it referred to the Court." 148
Norway has also emphasized the nature of the obligations of the
arrest warrants. "We urge all states involved to fulfil [sic] their
responsibility to make these warrants effective....We therefore urge
Sudan to cooperate fully with the Court and to comply with its legal
obligations without further delay." 149 Denmark has strongly
reiterated "those bearing the greatest responsibility for the most
serious crimes must be held accountable for their actions. No one
can be above the law. We urge all States to fulfill their obligations
under the Rome Statute and relevant instruments of international
law" 150 The Netherlands has pointed out how "[l]egal history was
made ... with the issuance of an arrest warrant against a sitting
Head of State, showing that the ICC exercises jurisdiction over
persons regardless of political stature." 151 Germany recalls "one of
the fundamental principles of the Rome Statute [is] that official
capacity does in no case exempt a person from criminal
responsibility." 152 Switzerland has expressed that "if we really want
to bring the impunity of the perpetrators of the most genius crimes
to an end, and prevent the recurrence of such crimes, it is imperative
that States respect their obligations under the Rome Statute as well

146. Id.
147. ICC, General Debate, Twelfth Sess. of the Assembly of States Parties, Statement
of Hungary at 1 (Nov. 27, 2013).
148. ICC, General Debate, Seventh Sess. of the Assembly of States Parties Statement
of Lichtenstein at 2 (Nov. 15, 2008).
149. ICC, General Debate, Seventh Sess. of the Assembly of States Parties, Statement
of Norway at 2 (Nov. 15, 2008).
150. ICC, General Debate, Ninth Sess. of the Assembly of States Parties, Statement
of Denmark at 2 (Nov. 19, 2009) (reiterated at ICC, General Debate, Ninth Sess. of the
Assembly of States Parties, Statement of Denmark at 3 (Dec. 6, 2010).
151. ICC, General Debate, Eighth Sess. of the Assembly of States Parties, Statement
of the Netherlands at ICC 2 (Nov. 19, (2009).
152. ICC, General Debate, Ninth Sess. of the Assembly of States Parties, Statement
of Germany at 2 (Dec. 6, 2010).

2019]

PERSONAL IMMUNITY

421

as the relevant Security Council resolutions." 153 Austria has repeated
that "in order to fight impunity for such serious crimes it is essential
that the law applies equally to all persons without distinction based
on official capacity." 154 Spain has noted "the principle that the
Rome Statute shall be applied equally without distinction based on
official capacity, as foreseen in Article 27, which remains a basic
principle to ensure the effective fight against impunity, the reason
why the ICC was created." 155 The UK has also repeated that "[o]ne
of the key principles of the Rome Statute, to which we are all
parties, is that it shall apply equally to all persons, without regard to
rank, title or position. This is the fundamental principle which
underpins the Court's work." 156
The voices from South America--Peru, Guatemala, Brazil, and
Argentina--all agreed that immunity is equal to impunity.157 Mexico
has often expressed its "deep concern regarding the refusal of some
States to cooperate with the International Criminal Court, in clear
violation of the international obligations derived from the Rome

Statute and, in certain cases, from the UN Charter." 158 Trinidad and
Tobago has been "hopeful that, like in the Lubanga case, other
persons accused of committing severe crimes in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Uganda, the Sudan and the Central African
Republic will be brought to justice." 159 Botswana has stressed that
"[i]t is imperative for States Parties to fulfill their obligation to
support and cooperate with the Court as required by Article 87 of
the Rome Statute. Similarly, States Parties are obliged to comply
with the political authority of the UN Security Council under the
provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter." 160
153. ICC, General Debate, Ninth Sess. of the Assembly of States Parties. Statement
of Switzerland at 5 (Dec. 6, 2010).
154. ICC, General Debate, Twelfth Sess. of the Assembly of States Parties, Statement
of Austria at 3 (Nov. 27, 2013).
155. ICC, General Debate, Twelfth Sess. of the Assembly of States Parties, Statement
of Spain at 3 (Nov. 21, 2013).
156. ICC, General Debate, Twelfth Sess. of the Assembly of States Parties, Statement
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland at 2 (Nov. 21, 2013).
157. Kwamchetsi Makokha, How the African Union Battle for Immunity Was Lost at the
Assembly
for
State
Parties,
DAILY
NATION
(Nov.
26,
2013),
https://mobile.nation.co.ke/blogs/AU-battle-for-ICC-immunity-/1949942-2088948format-xhtml-s sj qcwz/index.html.
158. ICC, General Debate, Ninth Sess. of the Assembly of States Parties, Statement
of Mexico at 5 (Dec. 6, 2010).
159. ICC, General Debate, Seventh Sess. of the Assembly of States Parties, Statement
of Trinidad & Tobago at 3 (Nov. 15, 2008).
160. ICC, General Debate, Twelfth Sess. of the Assembly of States Parties, Statement
of Botswana at
17-18 (Nov. 21, 2013).
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Even though most states have spoken strongly in favor of both
the irrelevance of official capacity and the absence of immunity
regarding the ICC's jurisdiction, there are some state parties and IOs
that have opposed the absence of immunity for sitting Heads of
State. The African Union (AU) has expressed concern regarding
"the issue of indictment of sitting Heads of State and Government
and its consequences on peace and stability and reconciliation in
African Union Member States." 161 This was particularly relevant in
AU's call "for a deferral of the ICC investigations and prosecutions
in relation to the 2008 post-election violence in Kenya under Article
16 of the Rome Statute." 162 Kenya has argued that "immunities for

sitting Heads of State exist in many domestic jurisdictions and that
this should also apply at the international level." 163 The AU also
distributed a draft resolution calling explicitly for immunity from
prosecution for sitting Heads of State and senior government
officials. It also called for Kenyatta not to appear before the ICC
until AU concerns have been addressed by the UNSC and the
ICC.164 "No charges shall be commenced or continued before any
international court or tribunal against any serving Head of State or
Government or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity
during his/her term of office." 165 This was not entirely an African
position though - Senegal, Cote d' Ivoire and Democratic Republic
of Congo disagreed, while South Africa and Tanzania spoke with
equivocation. 166

4. Assembly of State Parties- NGOs
NGOs have often affected the debate and outcomes at the ASP
as a result of the symbiotic relationship the ICC has with NGOs.
Despite state interpretations of what the Rome Statute provides for
immunities, NGOs have an inherently more pervasive reach

considering that their audience extends beyond the member states
of the ICC to civil society globally. There were two instances in

161. ICC, General Debate, Twelfth Sess. of the Assembly of States Parties, Statement
of Uganda on behalf of the African Union at 5 (Nov. 21, 2013).
162. Id.
163. Press Release, Coal. for the Int'l Crim. Ct., APS Debate on Head of State
Immunity (Nov. 21, 2013).
164. Press Release, Coal. for the Int'l Crim. Ct., AU Pits Presidential Immunity Against
Human Security (Oct. 15, 2013) [hereinafter CICC, Presidential Immunity].

165. Id.
166. Makokha, supra note 157.
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which NGOs took a particularly active and vocal role with respect
to the issue of Head of State immunity: the case of al-Bashir and
the case of Kenyatta. NGOs were not only instructive in expressing
what they thought the law to be, but also participated actively in
drafting recommendations to the ASP on its formulation.
Amnesty International published a legal memorandum titled
"Bringing Power to Justice" rejecting the argument that any state
could refuse to arrest and surrender al-Bashir by claiming that he
enjoys immunity as a Head of State. 167 This came immediately after
the PTC decisions on non-cooperation requesting that both the
UNSC and ASP act to urge states to enforce the arrest warrant. In
its memorandum, Amnesty International emphasized the statutes
of prior international criminal courts and tribunals that excluded
immunity for Heads of State and other governmental officials. It
also took note of the ICJ Arrest Warrant decision and the response
of the SLSC to the immunity claim in the Charles Taylor case.
"[T]he principle seems now established that the sovereign equality
of states does not prevent a Head of State from being prosecuted
before an international criminal tribunal or court." It also addressed
national legislation that rejects immunity from arrest or extradition
of anyone who is the subject of a request for surrender by the

ICC.168
The indictment and trial of Kenyatta led to a series of reactions
from AU states, the Court, and NGOs. Pre-ASP proposals
circulated for a "mass withdrawal" from the Rome Statute and for
total noncooperation by African states that led to a record low
attendance of less than a third of 54 AU Heads of State and
governments at the ASP. In response, over 130 African and
international NGOs wrote to the African ICC state parties calling
on them to reaffirm their support for the Court. 169 These pleas
became even louder during the sessions in which the issue of
immunity was raised, particularly in discussions relating to
amending the statute's immunity provisions. The CICC emphasized
that "[t]he Rome Statute allows for no reservations, and no
immunity for any individual regardless of position or office....None
167. ICC, General Debate, Ninth Sess. of the Assembly of States Parties, Statement
of Amnesty Int'l at 2 (Dec. 6, 2010).
168. Amnesty Int'l, Bringing Powerto Justice:Absence of Immun y for Heads of State Before the
International CriminalCourt, Al Index IOR 53/017/2010, 24-25 (2010) (quoting Prosecutor
v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on immunity from jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (May
31, 2004).
169. CICCI, Presidential Immunity, supranote 164.
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of these principles is more important than the provision against
immunity." 170 The Kenyan Human Rights Commission pointed out
in response to arguments that ICC trials hinder peace and
reconciliation that "[i]f states were to offer immunity to sitting
Heads of States and governments, this would negate the very
purpose that [the] Court was founded." 171 The International
Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) in its position paper
responded directly to claims on both the issue of immunity and the
possibility of amending Article 27. "The ICC was created to
prosecute the main perpetrators of international crimes, whose
commission generally implies a government policy or its tolerance.
The Rome Statute is clear: no immunities can be alleged before its
jurisdiction." 172 On amendments the FIDH took a position
expressing general International Law: "It is a well-established
principle that, before an international criminal tribunal, the official
capacity of the accused should be irrelevant in relation to
investigations and prosecutions trying to establish the alleged
responsibility for international crimes." 173 No Peace Without Justice
(NPWJ) offered a series of recommendations to the state parties
regarding the prevention of abuse of state immunities. In discussing
the proposed amendments to Article 27 of the Rome Statute,
NPWJ noted that "any proposed amendment that seeks to provide
a shield of State immunity for the application of any provision of
the Rome Statute should be resisted as an amendment that threatens
the fundamental principles underpinning the Court." 174

170. ICC, General Debate, Twelfth Sess. of the Assembly of States Parties, Statement
by the CICC at 2 (Nov. 21, 2013).
171. ICC, General Debate, Twelfth Sess. of the Assembly of States Parties, Statement
by the Kenya Human Rights Cmm'n at 2 (Nov. 21, 2013).
172. Int'l Fed'n for Human Rights (FIDH), Recommendations to the 12th Assembly of States
Partiesto the Statute of the InternationalCriminalCourt 4 (Nov. 21, 2013).
173. Id. at 5; see also ICC, General Debate, Twelfth Sess. of the Assembly of States
Parties, FIDH Speech at 1-2 (Nov. 21, 2013) ("The principle, that no one, whatever the
rank or position, can be above the law, constitutes a fundamental pillar of the Statute.
Presidential immunities or immunities for high level State officials are inadmissible before
the ICC. States have to support judicial independence as a guaranty of a fair trial for the
accused and have to recognize that only judges may decide on the modalities or exceptions
for the accused' [sic] possible absence during the trial. Any threat to the principles ruling the
Rome Statute are [sic] to be understood as a direct attack against victims' rights to justice
and reparation. Amendments to the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence must have for
only goal [sic] to strengthening and improving ICC proceedings, but never to moving away
from the Statute's spirit which defines its jurisdiction. FIDH urges States to avoid the
elaboration of ad hoc responses without a previous and genuine consultation process...").
174. No Peace Without Justice (NPWJ), Policy Prioritiesof No Peace Without Justice, at 15 (Nov. 21, 2013).
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In response to the AU's resolution spearheaded by Kenya
calling for immunity for sitting Heads of State and government, the
CICC reiterated that "[t]he provision of 'no immunity' was among
the greatest achievements of the governments and NGOs that
helped craft the Rome Statute. The Coalition hopes that
governments will never surrender this fundamental pillar of the
permanent ICC."175 Amnesty International urged state parties to
affirm their support for the principle set out in Article 27 of the
Rome Statute: "If sitting Heads of State were exempt from
prosecution by the ICC while they hold office, it would [...] be open
to abuse. While in power, those accused would be able to commit
crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC with impunity." 176
In a report to the special plenary session, the Victims' Rights
Working Group (VRWG) said it was especially concerned that, "if
implemented, the recommended freeze would undermine the work
of the TFV as it is currently only partially equipped to implement
its goals and, to date, has only been able to implement its assistance
mandate in two of seven ICC country situations." 177 At the same
time, Human Rights Watch (HRW) submitted a memorandum
stating that "the irrelevance of official capacity under Article 27 of
the Rome Statute is part and parcel of the court's mission that the
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as
a whole must not go unpunished." 178 HRW also emphasized that
"the irrelevance of official capacity has been a regular feature of
international courts since the post-World War II trials at Nuremberg
[...] Allowing official capacity to bar prosecution would thus
represent a major retreat in international criminal law and

practice." 179 The Kenyan Civil Society addressed both international
175. William R. Pace, Delivering on the Promise of Meaningful Justice to Victims 45 J. COAL.
INT'L CRIM. CT. 1, 2 (2013), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/monitor45_eng.pdf.
176. ICC, General Debate, Twelfth Sess. of the Assembly of States Parties, Amnesty
Int'l Statement to the General Debate, Al Index IOR 53/003/2013 (Nov. 21, 2013).
177. Victims' Rights Working Grp., The International Criminal Court at 10: The
Implementation of Victims' Rights 11 (2013).
178. Memorandum from the Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch
Memorandum for the Twelfth Session of the International Criminal Court Assembly of
States Parties 6 (Nov. 12, 2013) (quoting the Rome Statute, supra note 44, at pmbl. ¶ 4).
179. See id.; see also ICC, General Debate, Twelfth Sess. of the Assembly of States
Parties, Human Rights Watch Statement at 2-3 (Nov. 21, 2013) ("Second, we look to states
parties to insist on fidelity to the Rome Statute. States parties should be clear in debates at
this session that there will be no retreat from the Rome Statute's proscription of immunity
for sitting governmental officials in Article 27. Granting immunity to sitting leaders would
undermine the fundamental principle that no one should be above the law. It would create
perverse and destabilizing incentives for gaining and holding on to power.").
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and national law suggesting that "the Rome Statute system
deliberately ensured that there would be no immunity for any
individual on the basis of official capacity." 180
In making such forceful interventions to preserve the Rome
Statute provisions excluding immunity for sitting Heads of State
indictments, these NGOs have contributed actively to the
development of the normative agenda on personal immunity for

Heads of State before the ICC. 181
E. InternationalOganizations
1. The United Nations Security Council
The UNSC has been a primary actor in the movement away
from absolute personal immunities. The exercise of Chapter VII
power to remove immunities for the protection of international
peace and security would have been unthinkable under traditional
CIL's absolute personal immunity norms. Under the hierarchy
established by the United Nations Charter (UNC) in Articles 25 and

103, obligations to comply with a binding UNSC Chapter VII
Resolution prevail over others.182 If CIL did not provide so already,
UNSC removed immunities for the first time in the prosecution of
Milosevic before the ICTY.183 Insofar as the UNSC is exercising its
powers under Chapter VII in response to a threat to international

180. Njonjo Mue, Debate on Prosecuting Heads of State and Government and Its
Consequences on Peace, Stability and Reconciliation 2 (Nov. 22, 2013).
181. Id. at 1-3.
182. See U.N. Charter art. 25, 103; see also Rudolf Bernhardt, Article 103, in THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1298-99 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002) (asserting
that the underlying ideas of Article 103 of the Charter extend to inconsistent obligations
under CIL).
183. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Amici Curiae Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98bis (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Mar. 3, 2004); Prosecutor v. Sainovi6 et al., Case No. IT-05-87-T, Decision on Milutinovi
Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 10 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 22,
2007); Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Prosecution Response to Amici
Curiae Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98bis (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Mar. 23, 2004). The Trial Chamber considered the argument that the
ICTY does not have jurisdiction over Milosevic "by reason of his status as former
President." Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54, Decision on Preliminary
Motions, ¶ 26-34 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 8, 2001). The Trial
Chamber interpreted this argument as a challenge to Article 7(2) of the ICTY Statute and
concluded that "[t]here is absolutely no basis for challenging the validity of Article 7,
paragraph 2, which at this time reflects a rule of customary international law." Id. at 27-28.
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peace and security, 184 member states are considered to have
accepted the removal of immunity by having consented to the UNC
framework for the protection of international peace and security.185
Voices in the UNSC debate that led to the establishment of the
ICTY reflected this rationale. For instance, Hungary was very vocal
in this debate over immunity, stating that "the official status of the
individual brought to Court, whatever it might be, does not
immunize him from his criminal liability.1 86
Before the ICC, the exercise of jurisdiction over sitting Heads
of State of non-state parties is justified through UNSC Resolutions,
such as Resolution 1593. For instance, the UNSC obliged Sudan to
cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the
Court and the Prosecutor. 187 This obligation ought to incorporate
either the presumption that no personal immunity exists given the
nature of the Court, or the duty of Sudan to waive any immunity
that could obstruct the ICC's jurisdiction. 88 But the existence of
this obligation under the resolution does not answer whether
personal immunity exists before international criminal courts and
tribunals as a matter of CIL, or whether Article 27 of the Rome
Statute applies to non-state parties. In requesting a state's full
cooperation with the ICC after a UNSC referral, the UNSC extends
an obligation to waive immunity altogether that is distinct from the
effect of Article 27, which waives any immunity for the purposes
of the ICC.189 But despite the source of the obligation, the UNSC
has, in practice, accepted that there are instances where, for the
purposes of maintaining international peace and security, an
exception to absolute personal immunity exists through the exercise
of jurisdiction by international criminal courts and tribunals.

2.

The African Union

The African Union (AU) has had a turbulent relationship with
the concept of personal immunity for Heads of State even though

184. This distinguishes the question of immunity before the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, which was not established pursuant to a resolution of the Security Council utilizing
its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter.
185. Williams & Sherif, supranote 81, at 79.
186. U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 21, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (May 25, 1993).
187. S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 2 (Mar. 31, 2005).
188. Kevin J. Heller, ICC Prosecutor to Charge Sudan's President with Genocide, OPINIO
JURIS (July 11, 2008), http://opiniojuris.org/2008/07/11/icc-prosecutor-to-chargesudans-president-with-genocide/.
189. Blommestijn & Ryngaert, supranote 22, at 435.
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many of its members are state parties to the ICC. While it has not,
in principle, been opposed to the exercise of jurisdiction of the ICC
over former Heads of State, the AU's position regarding exceptions
to absolute personal immunity for sitting Heads of State has been
most antagonistic. In several statements, delegates within the AU
have reaffirmed their conviction that national laws and CIL provide
that sitting Heads of State are granted immunities during their time
in office. They have agreed that "no charges shall be commenced or
continued before any international court or tribunal against any

serving Head of State or Government or anybody acting or entitled
to act in such capacity during his/her term of office." 190
The first call for non-cooperation by the AU came shortly after
al-Bashir's indictment and has since been reiterated. 19 1 In its 2009

decision, the AU expressed concern about PTC's indictment and
decided that "the AU Member States shall not cooperate pursuant
to the provisions of Article 98 of the Rome Statute of the ICC
relating to immunities, for the arrest and surrender of President
Omar El Bashir of Sudan." 192 The non-cooperation obligation has
been subsequently confirmed in AU Resolutions up to 2015, noting
that "the need for all Member States to comply with the position of
the Assembly of the Union regarding the warrants issued by the ICC
against President Bashir." 193

The indictments of the sitting Head of State of Kenya added
fuel to the fire. Kenya, as party to the Rome Statute, has
continuously expressed its belief that it has been cooperating with
the ICC "despite national and international customary laws, including
in many Western countries, which guarantee sitting Heads of State
and Government immunity from prosecution during their tenure of

190. African Union [AU], Decision on Africa's Relationship with the Intenational Criminal
Court (ICC), Extraordinary Session, Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1, ¶ 10 (Oct. 12, 2013)
[hereinafter AU, Decision on the ICC].
191. African Union [AU], Decision on the Meeting of African States Partiesto the Rome Statute
of the InternationalCriminalCourt,Thirteenth Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII)
Rev. 1, ¶ 10 (July 3, 2009) [hereinafter AU, Decision on the Rome Statute]; African Union [AU],

Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of Decision
Assemb/y/AU/Dec.270(XI) on the Second Ministerial Meeting on the Rome Statute of the
International CriminalCourt (ICC), Fifteenth Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/Dec.296 (XV),
¶ 5 (July 27, 2010) [hereinafter AU, Decision on the Progress Report].
192. See AU, Decision on the Rome Statute, supra note 191.

193. Decisionon the ProgressReport of the Commission on the Implementation of PreviousDecisions
on

the International Criminal Court (ICC), Twenty-Fourth
Assembly/AU/Dec.547(XXIV), ¶ 19 (Jan. 31, 2015).

Ordinary

Session,

2019]

PERSONAL IMMUNITY

429

office." 194 Siding with Kenya, the AU decided that no charges will
commence or continue before any international criminal court
against a serving AU Head of State, and that the trials of Kenyatta
and Ruto be suspended until they complete their terms of office. 195
The AU's stance against any exceptions to immunity for sitting
Heads of State has extended to existing Chapter VII UNSC
Resolutions. The PTC has addressed this conflict in this as well as
prior situations of non-cooperation by invoking Article 103 of the
UNC stating that, in the event of a conflict of member states
between the obligations under the UNC and their obligations under
any other international agreement, their obligations under the
UNSC shall prevail. 196 In its decision on the cooperation of DRC,
the PTC emphasized that "the DRC cannot invoke any other
decision, including that of the African Union, providing for any
obligation to the contrary," 197 considering that the UNSC implicitly
lifted al-Bashir's immunities through Resolution 1593.
The AU remains committed to ensuring personal immunity for
sitting Heads of State despite its operation as a regional organization
that draws its mandate on international peace and security from the
UNC, and must be "consistent with the Purposes and Principles of
the United Nations." 198

3.

The U.N. Legal Committee, the InternationalLaw Commission, and
the Institute of InternationalLaw

The legal committee of the U.N. discussed the changing nature
and scope of CIL rules on immunity. While some maintained that
immunity remains absolute with no exceptions in CIL, others
argued that immunity was the general rule with some exceptions.
Some raised the idea of serious international crimes as criterion for
identifying exceptions to immunity. 199 Others mentioned crimes
that fall within the jurisdiction of international courts and

194. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Comm'n Chairperson, African Union, Welcome
Remarks to the Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government
(Oct. 12, 2013).

195. See AU, Decision on the ICC, supra note 190,

¶ 10.

196 U.N. Charter art. 103.
197. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo Regarding Omar Al Bashir's Arrest and Surrender to the Court, ¶ 31 (Apr. 9,
2014) (quoting U.N. Charter art. 103).
198. Cf U.N. Charter art. 52.
199. See CIARA DAMGAARD, INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CORE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 263 (2008).
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tribunals. 200 One delegation, however, suggested that exceptions to
immunity could undermine international relations by allowing
politically motivated indictments, and others asked for caution in
addressing the issue of exceptions to immunity.20 1

The ILC considered the issue of immunities in its discussion
for the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of
Mankind after a request of the UNGA. At its forty-third session,
the Commission adopted on first reading the Draft Code of Crimes
against the Peace and Security of Mankind, including Draft Article
13, which states that "the official position of an individual who
commits a crime against the peace and security of mankind, and
particularly the fact that he acts as Head of State or Government,
does not relieve him of criminal responsibility." The Article was
modeled after Principle III of the Nuremberg Principles and did
not on first reading give rise to any objections by governments. 202
In the second draft prepared by the ILC, the placement of Draft
Article 13 was changed to Draft Article 7 and read, "the official
position of an individual who commits a crime against the peace
and security of mankind, even if he acted as Head of State or
Government, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility or
mitigate punishment." 203
The Institute of International Law addressed only the issue of
jurisdiction exercised by a foreign state against a person having
personal immunity for the prosecution of alleged international
crimes. In its Resolution on the Immunity from Jurisdiction of the
State and of Persons Who Act on Behalf of the State it stated that
"[n]o immunity from jurisdiction other than personal immunity in
accordance with international law applies with regard to

international crimes." However, it did not address the issue of
whether personal immunity subsists before an international criminal
court or tribunal. Its earlier Resolution on Immunities from

Jurisdiction and Execution of Heads of State and of Government
in International Law that expressed a similar spirit read, "[n]othing
in this Resolution implies nor can be taken to mean that a Head of

200. See Sevrine Knuchel, State Immunity and the Promise of Jus Cogens, 9 Nw. U. J. INT'L
HUM. RTS. 149, 149 (2011); see also Thomas Weatherall, Jus Cogens and Sovereign Immuniy:
Reconciling Divergence in Contemporay Jurisprudence,46 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1151, 1153 (2015).
201. See Second Report on Immunity, supra note 13, ¶ 10.
202. See Secretariat Memorandum, supra note 10.
203. Institut de Droit International, Immunitiesfrom Jursdiction and Execution of Heads of
State and of Government in InternationalLaw (Aug. 26, 2001).
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State enjoys an immunity before an international tribunal with
universal or regional jurisdiction." 20 4
IV. WHAT INSIGHTS DOES NETWORK ANALYSIS PROVIDE?
The tools of Social Network Analysis (SNA) help describe
quantitatively the shift we are currently witnessing in personal

immunity norms for Heads of State before ICCTs. SNA is a
collection of measures and tools for relational analysis designed to
understand the most important features of social structures as
networks. 205 The indispensable elements of all networks are actors
with relations. 20 6 Social network analysis focuses on these relations
as links among nodes. By examining international normative
development through networks, we are able to analyze how certain
actors shape norms, describe the process of norm-making, and
largely predict the trajectory of a given norm.

A. Graphingthe Network
Graph theory helps analyze and visualize the connections
among the actors involved in normative development. 207 Graph
visualizations thus represent the nodes and links of a network in a
way that promotes easier understanding of the structures and
relationships represented by the graph. While a graph can provide a
visualization for a network that we can compare to other graphs
with a quick glimpse, to fully describe and compare these networks,
we use a set of quantitative measures that represent some of the
networks' properties.

204. Id.
205. JOHN SCOTT, WHAT IS SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS? 85 (2012).
206. DAVID KNOKE & SONG YANG, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 6-7 (2d ed. 2008).
207. FABRIZIO DE VICO FALLANI & FABIO BABILONI, THE GRAPH THEORETICAL
APPROACH IN BRAIN FUNCTIONAL NETWORKS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 13 (2010).
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The Hub and Spoke Topology of the Persona! Immuni/y CIL Norm

uI

Forced Atlas 2 White

The graph above is a connected, undirected, weighted graph.
This means that the relationships among actors flow both ways. The
graph also represents the intensity of the interaction by increasing
or decreasing the size or shade of the color of an edge connecting
two nodes. The larger or darker the edge between two nodes, the
higher the weight of that interaction. Also, by extension, the larger
or darker the size or color of a node is, the greater the weight of that
node. Nodes with larger size and darker blue color are the ones that
are more central to the network. Light blue and white colors reflect
medium centrality nodes, while light red and deep red colors reflect
the least central nodes in the network. As the nodes decrease in size,
their degree of centrality also decreases.
Centrality measures the rough social power of a node based on
its connectivity to the rest of the network. It is based on the

fundamental premise that the way a node is embedded in the
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network on the basis of its relations with other nodes imposes
constraints on that node and offers opportunities through
connection to other nodes. Those nodes that face fewer constraints
and have more opportunities are in structurally favorable positions
over other nodes in the network, and these positions may lead to
quicker or more numerous exchanges and greater influence, and
may turn a node into a focal point in the network, particularly in
relation to other nodes that are in less favored positions. 208 Degree
centrality specifically measures the network activity of each node
using the number of direct connections of a node. In other words,
degree centrality represents the amount of links each node has with
other nodes in the network; it is the sum of all links connected to a
node. 209 The more links an actor has, the more power it may have.
Most nodes usually have a relatively smaller degree while fewer
nodes have a much larger degree compared to all nodes in the
network. In this network, even though the average degree is 14.578
(see figure below on degree distribution), which is relatively small,
some nodes have a very large degree because they are connected to
most, if not all, other nodes. The graph illustrates that the nodes
"ICC" (ASP & PTC) and "CICC" are central nodes that accumulate
the highest connectivity in the network. Nodes with higher degrees
of connectivity are defined as "hubs." 210 In other words, a hub is a
node with a larger number of links surrounded by nodes that have
fewer links, also known as "non-hubs." 211 Hubs are those nodes that
have the most structured and intense relationships to other nodes
in the network and functionally become "privileged nodes." 212 They
are the network's strongest links 213 and their structural position
within the network facilitates connectivity between interacting
nodes. 214 Hubs are thus the main means of management,

&

208. Robert A. Hanneman & Mark Riddle, Centrality and Power, in INTRODUCTION TO
SOCIAL NETWORK METHODS (2005).
209. IAN MCCULLOH, HELEN ARMSTRONG & ANTHONY JOHNSON, SOCIAL
NETWORK ANALYSIS WITH APPLICATIONS 34 (2013).
210. SYSTEMS BIOLOGY IN CANCER RESEARCH & DRUG DISCOVERY 173 (Asfar S.
Azmi ed., 2012).
211. Kyaw Tun et al., Rich Can Get Poor: Conversion of Hub to Non-Hub Proteins, 2 SYS.
SYNTHETIC B1o. 75 (2008).
212. PETER J. TAYLOR, WORLD CITY NETWORK: A GLOBAL URBAN ANALYSIS 26
(2004).
213. RICHARD KOCH & GREG LOCKWOOD, SUPERCONNECT: HARNESSING THE
POWER OF NETWORKS & THE STRENGTH OF WEAK LINKS 67 (2010).
214. Morton E. O'Kelly, A Geographer's Analysis of Hub-and-Spoke Networks, 6 J.
TRANSPORT GEO. 171, 186 (2008).
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exchange, 215 and cooperation in a network. 216 The potential removal
of a hub or hubs would cause significant levels of fragmentation in
such a network.217
Networks that include hubs are called hub-and-spoke networks.
The network we have here is a hub-and-spoke network with the two

nodes of ICC and CICC representing two hubs that are connected
via an inter-hub link. These two hubs are each connected to an
almost identical set of actors, although the strength of these
connections varies. Knowing the topology of a network including
the presence of a hub or hubs allows us to have a better structural
sense of the network, improve our understanding of network flows,
and identify the actors that are critical to network flows. Hubs hold
a special place of influence within the network and are likely to be
less dependent on other nodes in the network. 218 Hubs in
international relations can withhold social benefits such as
membership and recognition, enact social sanctions that create

circumstances of marginalization or indirect coercion, and tend to
harness more support from other actors in the case of conflict
particularly as this relates to the interpretation and application of
normative shifts. 219 Hubs are also able to more effectively set
agendas, frame debates, and successfully promulgate policies of

their choice.220 Thus, as hubs, these nodes-ICC and CICC
determine the norm-generating effects within this network. But

other metrics and tools designed to rank nodes based on their
position in the network are essential for analyzing aspects of
centrality, and understanding the prominence of a node in a social
structure. 221

&

215. Tun et al., supra note 211.
216. KOCH & LOCKWOOD, supra note 213.
217. Id. at 151-52.
218. MCCULLOH, ARMSTRONG & JOHNSON, supra note 209, at 33; Hanneman
Riddle, supra note 208.
219. HAFNER-BURTON, KAHLER & MONTGOMERY, supra note 28, at 570.
220. Id.
221. Ulrik Brandes, A FasterAlgorithmfor Betweenness Centrality, 25 J. MATH. SOC. 163
(2001); Linton C. Freeman, Centrality in Social Networks: Conceptual Clarification, 1 SOCIAL
NETWORKS 215 (1978); Gert Sabidussi, The Centraliy Index of a Graph, 31 PSYCHOMETRIKA
581 (1966); Alex Bavelas, A Mathematical Model for Group Structures, 7 APPLIED
ANTHROPOLOGY 16 (1948).
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2.

MeasuringDensity

The density of the network provides a measure of the extent to
which a node's immediate contacts are mutually connected with
each other. In other words, it measures how close the network is to
complete, with a complete network having all possible edges
connected and a density equal to 1. In social network words, the
more of my friends who are also friends with one another, the
greater the density of my network. Density is a good indication of
the network's cohesion and by extension the cost-efficiency,
effectiveness, and speed with which information and resources flow
and spread within a network. Density is particularly instructive in
establishing the extent of spread in a network, that is, the number
of nodes affected by the diffusion of things like information,

resources, and norms initiated by a single or set of nodes. 222 For
networks of International Law making, density allows us to look at
222. Habiba Habiba & Tanya Berger-Wolf, Dep't of Computer Science, Univ. of
Chicago, Working for Influence: Effect of Network Density and Modularity on Diffusion
in Networks, Conference: Data Mining Workshops 4 (2011).
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how easily or quickly a new normative prescription can reach other
nodes within the network.
The concept of "effective density" more specifically reflects the
correlation of density and spread 223 and is particularly useful here as
it helps us assess the probability of a normative effect within a
network. Effective density also allows us to assess the optimal
spreaders in a network, in other words those nodes that have the
capacity to maximize the extent of a spread of resources,
information, and anything else that might flow through the network.
However, networks may not always have particularly influential
nodes in this regard. Habiba and Berger-Wolffs epidemiological
study found that, in networks with low effective densities (S .004
for real networks and S .001 for synthetic or artificial networks), a
spread will always be low irrespective of who generates it or the
sophistication of the approach. 224 In such networks, only hubs or
other high-weighted nodes are able to influence the spread, if at
all. 225 Similarly, the study observes that at high densities ( 0.25 for
real networks and
.0035 for synthetic networks), most nodes are
well connected and the spread by any random node is high and
comparable to the optimal spread due to high similarity in
connectivity of nodes. In such a network, spreads are "almost
deterministically" likely to affect the entire network. 226 In other
words, high degree nodes achieve optimal spreads in low density
networks while in denser networks any spread initiators may achieve
227
optimal spreads.
The density in this network is 0.331 (see figure below). While
this density may not be of the highest possible, it is > 0.25,
suggesting that a spread by any random node is high and
comparable to the optimal spread due to high similarity in
connectivity of nodes. 228 This means that any node in this network
could reach all other nodes in advancing its own or a shared agenda.
223.

Id.;

see also B. ADITYA PRAKASH ET AL., VIRUS PROPAGATION ON TIME-

VARYING NETWORKS: THEORY & IMMUNIZATION ALGORITHMS (J.L. Balcazar & F.
Bonchi eds., 2010); David Kempe, Jon Kleinberg & Eva Tardos, Maximitnu the Spread of
Influence Through a Social Network in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH INT'L CONF. ON
KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA MINING (2003); Hanghang Tong et al., On the
Vulnerability of Large Graphs, IEEE 10th Int'l ConE (2010); Nicholas C. Valler et al.,
Epidemic Spread in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks: Determining the Tipping Point, Int'l ConE
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This explains both the large spread of the changing nature of
personal immunity before the ICC as well as the quick spread of the
AU's hesitance and pushback regarding sitting Heads of State. The
fact that the spread isn't sensitive to the identity of the initiator
explains the developments in both the trend of change in the rules
of personal immunity and the outcome of the pushback from the
AU. Even though the change in rules of personal immunity within

Degree Distribution
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was2Esbt

(e

atluptae
the AU

this network was supported by one of the hubs (ICC), as opposed
to the AU pushback that was not initiated by a hub, both received

high levels of reception. In other words, in this network the degree
centrality of the initiator isn't particularly relevant in achieving
optimal spread and will unlikely affect the final outcome of a norm's
development. Most actors could likely initiate and achieve an almost
optimal spread, which allows the actors involved to reach all other
actors in the network and pursue their agendas more easily and
efficiently.
3.

Bigenvector Centraiy
Despite the idea that the spread itself is not sensitive to the

identity of the actor, the result produced is. Here another metric of
centrality is helpful. While degree centrality, as we examined above,
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determines influence through a simple measure of links per actor,
eigenvector centrality brings
forward the idea that not all links are of equal value. A node will
have high eigenvector centrality if it is connected to other highly

connected nodes. In
other words, the importance of a node likely increases if it is
connected to other nodes that are themselves important. Therefore,
links to nodes that are very highly connected will give a certain node
more influence than links to nodes that are less connected.229
Because of their connectedness to such highly connected nodes,
nodes with high eigenvector centrality are also particularly
influential nodes in the network. 230 This means that eigenvector
centrality is strictly dependent on the degree centrality of the nodes
to which a node connects.
The eigenvector centrality distribution which incorporates the
weight of the links to certain nodes in this network is 9.479 (see
figure below on eigenvector centrality distribution). In examining
the distribution of centralities, we can assess their variability against
the mean. Though we see that for most actors there is relatively little
variability in centralities, there are two actors, the hubs in this
network, with particularly high centrality. 231 This suggests that,
although between most actors there are not great inequalities in
actor centrality or power, the two hubs of this network accumulate
significantly high centrality and therefore influence. This explains
why the actors of this network have received the changing nature of
the rules of personal immunity that the two hubs have promulgated
more positively than the AU's or individual countries' calls for
retention of the old CIL regime and amendment of the Rome
Statute to codify this. This phenomenon is particularly significant to
recognize due to the fact that the status quo always has inertia on
its side. The normative shift from the status quo suggests that the
influence exerted here to promulgate a normative shift is substantial.
There is a structural explanation for this outcome in the
network. A hub may perhaps not occupy a superior position in the
information it can spread given the effective density of this network,
but it enjoys more influence on whether this information will likely
be adopted by the rest of the network. Should the interests and
agendas of the actors collide, a hub is likely to exercise more
influence and therefore achieve higher levels of support and
229. MCGULLOH, ARMSTRONG & JOHNSON,
230. Id.
231. Hanneman & Riddle, supranote 208.

supra note

209, at 46.
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compliance than a non-hub. This means that we are likely to see
normative suggestions initiated by the hubs of this network succeed.
For the rules on personal immunity this means that insofar as the
hubs in this network continue to pursue the establishment of an
exception for Heads of States before ICCTs, we are likely to see it
crystallize as a new rule.

Eigenvector Centrality Distribution
11

0

0

1

Number of iterations: 50

Sum change: 9.479538697364995E-4

4.

Similarity ofActors

Finally, this network has another interesting structural quality
relating to its actors' similarity and their potential contribution to
normative development. Notions of similarity force us to think
about actors not only individually as entities but also within sets of
categories by systematizing what makes them similar, what makes
them different, and from which other actors or categories of actors
they differ. In social network analysis, we base this taxonomy on
similarities of patterns of relations among actors rather than
individual actor attributes.232 These often represent the "social
232. A. James O'Malley & Peter V. Marsden, The Anaysis of SocialNetworks, 8 HEALTH
SERV. & OUTCOMES RES. METHODOLOGY 222 (2008).
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positions" actors might share, or similar building blocks that
provide regularities in patterns of relations among them. 233 For
instance, the social role of a "wife" typically implies a patterned set
of interactions with a member of other social categories such as
"wife," "husband," or "child."
In networks, this suggests that similar nodes are connected to
the same or similar nodes and can therefore be substitutable if one
fails or decides to leave the network. When two nodes share most

of the same network nodes then these nodes are considered to be
sufficiently similar to be regarded as equivalent.234 The idea behind
equivalence is to identify uniform or highly similar actions and links
that define certain social positions within a network. 235 Actors in a
network may occupy positions of equivalence without the rest of
the network's actors knowing or having recognized this effect. This
is one of the ways in which new roles emerge in a network out of
actions and relations among agents that begin to crystallize before
the rest of the network fully identifies what they are. The two hubs
in this network have almost identical links to the rest of the network
which satisfies a fairly high threshold to regard them as sufficiently
similar and therefore structurally equivalent.

1ICC n
SE (ICC, CICC) = J(ICC, CICC) = -----

CICC|

|ICC UCICC|

= 0.92(out of 1 for identical nodes)
But what effect does this have in this network? Structurally
equivalent actors are effectively substitutable in that they occupy
equivalent positions of connectivity, and therefore power, and
influence in a network. Though social equivalence was primarily
used as a means to describe social structure, it has increasingly been

used in order to predict the behavior of actors based on their social
role in the network. 236 Structurally equivalent actors are more likely
to behave similarly in a given network; they are, in fact, likely to
behave more similarly than even actors grouped on the basis of

233. STANLEY WASSERMAN & KATHERINE FAUST, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS:
METHODS AND APPLICATIONS 463 (1994).
234. Id.
235. See JOHN SCOTT, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS: A HANDBOOK 124-26 (2d ed.

2000).
236. RONALD S. BURT, TOWARD A STRUCTURAL THEORY OF ACTION: NETWORK
MODELS OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE, PERCEPTION, & ACTION (1982).
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cohesion and substantive similarity such as actors that belong
substantively to the same kind or class. 237
The position of the two structurally equivalent nodes here, ICC
and CICC, as hubs in the network suggests that they are also in
structurally favorable positions. They face less constraints and enjoy
more exchanges and greater influence in the network. 238 Nodes with
privileged positions in a network are able to set agendas, frame
debates, and promulgate laws and policies that are in line with their
interests and to their benefit.239 Despite the fact that institutionally
CICC is an NGO and the ICC is an organization comprised of
states with sovereign rights and privileges, the two nodes in this
network enjoy both a similar structural position as well as power
and influence. What we see is that, regardless of the legal barriers
that CICC's nature as a coalition of NGOs carries, it has established
itself in a defacto position where it is able to influence the network
just as much, and in a similar manner, as the states involved. Nonstate actors, even though not formally accepted as lawmakers, in this
network have a normative effect absent formal legal justification.
The recognition of this fact is particularly important in
understanding both the inclining role of non-state actors in
networks that generate normative legal developments but also
conceptualize better their structural de facto position in
international law and international legislative action.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article has sought to provide a set of new insights through
the use of the quantitative tools of SNA to the currently shifting
norm of personal immunity for Heads of State. After examining
existing jurisprudence and identifying the actors involved in the

development of the CIL norm before ICCTs, I used the data
collected to perform SNA.
There, I found a hub-and-spoke network that involves two

hubs, the ASP & PTC on the one hand, and the CICC on the other,
connected through an inter-hub link. Other nodes in this network
237. RONALD S. BURT & MICHAEL J. MINOR, APPLIED NETWORK ANALYSIS: A
METHODOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION 272 (1983); see also Joseph Galaskiewicz & Ronald S.
Burt, Interorgani ation Contagion in CorporatePhilanthropy, 36 ADMIN. SC. Q. 88 (1991); BURT,
supranote 238.
238. Richard Medina & George Hepner, Geospatial Analysis of Dynamic Terrorist
Networks, in VALUES & VIOLENCE: INTANGIBLE ASPECTS OF TERRORISM 151 (Ibrahim A.
Karawan, Wayne McCormack & Stephen E. Reynolds eds., 2009).
239. HAFNER-BURTON, KAHLER & MONTGOMERY, supranote 28, at 579.
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involve several states, IOs, and ICCTs. I examined the network's
density and effective density, which, being relatively high, suggest
that any actor in the network can efficiently spread normative
prescriptions to other actors. I addressed eigenvector centrality and
uncovered that there are two actors, the hubs in this network, with
particularly high eigenvector centrality, which explains why they are
able to exert much influence over shifting the CIL norms on
personal immunity. Finally, I assessed the similarity of actors in the
networks and determined that the structural equivalence of the two
hubs in this network assists in explaining why the CICC is able to
play a highly influential role in this CIL normative shift despite its
status as a non-state actor. The quantitative analysis confirms the
changes we have intuitively witnessed in practice followed by
academic debate, and further predicts that insofar as the hubs in this
network continue to pursue the establishment of an exception for
Heads of States personal immunity for international crimes, we are
likely to see it crystallize in CIL.
SNA and other descriptive quantitative work can help examine
how actors connect and behave in small or large groups that
introduce, adopt, or dissolve international legal norms. Graph
theory allows us to transform these three-dimensional processes
into two-dimensional graphs of nodes (actors) and edges (links),
and to quantify relationships and their properties. This insight helps
us quantify and map actors' and networks' contributions to
international legislative processes as well as uncover the elusive
global realities that lead to international law making. It is my hope
that international lawyers, through the framework this Article
provides, are encouraged to use more systematically these
descriptive, quantitative tools in order to assist in explaining and
substantiating international legal developments in the future.

